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Message-ID: <1351274374.18115.205.camel@falcor>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 13:59:34 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg@...hat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Khalid Aziz <khalid@...ehiking.org>, kexec@...ts.infradead.org,
horms@...ge.net.au, Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...el.com>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...ito.it>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: Kdump with signed images
On Fri, 2012-10-26 at 03:39 +0100, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 09:15:58PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>
> > On a running system, the package installer, after verifying the package
> > integrity, would install each file with the associated 'security.ima'
> > extended attribute. The 'security.evm' digital signature would be
> > installed with an HMAC, calculated using a system unique key.
>
> The idea isn't to prevent /sbin/kexec from being modified after
> installation - it's to prevent it from being possible to install a
> system that has a modified /sbin/kexec.
Understood.
> Leaving any part of this up to
> the package installer means that it doesn't solve the problem we're
> trying to solve here. It must be impossible for the kernel to launch any
> /sbin/kexec that hasn't been signed by a trusted key that's been built
> into the kernel,
With Dmitry's patch "5e0d1a4 ima: added policy support for security.ima
type", or something similar, we can force 'security.ima' to a specific
type, in this case, a digital signature. With that patch, this
shouldn't be a problem.
> and it must be impossible for anything other than
> /sbin/kexec to make the kexec system call.
Permission is a MAC issue. :)
thanks,
Mimi
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