[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20121031171733.0ff2a976@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk>
Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2012 17:17:33 +0000
From: Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Shea Levy <shea@...alevy.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>, Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...il.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
> >> Prepare (as a root) a hand-crafted image, reboot, let the kernel resume
> >> from that artificial image.
> > It's not signed. It won't reboot from that image.
>
> So then to hibernate the kernel must have a signing key?
No.
If you break the kernel so you can patch swap we already lost.
If you add a new bootable image and reboot your image won't boot anyway
If you've got physical access you've already won
So you can't break the swap image before hibernation. You can't boot
something else to tamper with it and you've not got physical access.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists