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Message-ID: <1351763954.2391.37.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com>
Date: Thu, 01 Nov 2012 09:59:14 +0000
From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>
To: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
Cc: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@...e.de>,
Chris Friesen <chris.friesen@...band.com>,
Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
On Thu, 2012-11-01 at 10:45 +0100, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Thu, 1 Nov 2012, James Bottomley wrote:
>
> > I'm actually just struggling to understand the use case for these more
> > esoteric protections.
>
> I believe the real point is drawing a clear line between trusted and
> untrusted (with root being userspace, hence implicitly untrusted), and
> disallowing "legitimate crossing" of this line.
But that doesn't really help me: untrusted root is an oxymoron. I get
capability separated systems, where you invest trust in layers and you
make each layer small and verifiable, so you have a granular trust
policy you build up. I really don't understand the use case for trying
to remove a small portion of trust from the huge trust domain of root
and then doing a massive amount of fixup around the edges because
there's leaks all over the place from the trust that root still has. It
all seems to be a bit backwards. If you just begin with the capability
separated granular system, I don't see why it doesn't all just work with
what we have today.
James
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