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Message-Id: <1351785096-32473-1-git-send-email-linkinjeon@gmail.com>
Date:	Fri,  2 Nov 2012 00:51:36 +0900
From:	Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@...il.com>
To:	eparis@...isplace.org
Cc:	hirofumi@...l.parknet.co.jp, sgruszka@...hat.com,
	viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@...il.com>,
	Pankaj Kumar <jangra.pankaj9@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH] fs: notify: Fix race condition between umount and inotify_rm_watch

When a user is monitoring an FS_UMOUNT watch using the inotify framework,
there can be a potential race condition between the umount path &
inotify_rm_watch. This scenario can be like-
=================================================================
user does the following calls-
fd = inotify_init();
inotify_add_watch(path, IN_UNMOUNT); /* added a watch to path*/
read(fd); /* wait for the event */
inotify_rm_watch(); /* as soon as event came, remove the
watch tag from the selected path */

Now as we trigger the umount command on the above mentioned path,
it will trigger a fsnotification for all the waiting inotify watches,
and then userspace will find that event came, it does the required
action and remove the watch.
Now while watch is being removed, there is possibility that umount
process is still under execution & in not complete and on the other
path inotify_rm_watch() will call an iput() on the watched inode,
then there can be a race whether the inode's superblock is valid
at that moment or its gone.
So some time we end up in this race very badly and we try to access
the super_block which now not in a valid memory and kernel dies. Trace
is like shown below

  138.892000] [<c02f1050>] (do_raw_spin_trylock+0x0/0x54) from
  [<c043e590>] (__raw_spin_lock+0x34/0x90)
  [  138.900000] [<c043e55c>] (__raw_spin_lock+0x0/0x90) from
  [<c043e604>] (_raw_spin_lock+0x18/0x1c)
  [  138.908000]  r5:000000bc r4:e3db94f0
  [  138.912000] [<c043e5ec>] (_raw_spin_lock+0x0/0x1c) from
  [<c01e3c94>] (fat_detach+0x3c/0x80)
  [  138.920000] [<c01e3c58>] (fat_detach+0x0/0x80) from [<c01e3d40>]
  (fat_evict_inode+0x68/0x6c)
  [  138.932000]  r5:c0459cc0 r4:e3db94f0
  [  138.932000] [<c01e3cd8>] (fat_evict_inode+0x0/0x6c) from
  [<c0154f00>] (evict+0x94/0x154)
  [  138.940000]  r4:e3db94f0 r3:c01e3cd8
  [  138.944000] [<c0154e6c>] (evict+0x0/0x154) from [<c0155184>]
  (iput+0x17c/0x18c)
  [  138.952000]  r5:e3db9504 r4:e3db94f0
  [  138.956000] [<c0155008>] (iput+0x0/0x18c) from [<c0173ae4>]
  (fsnotify_destroy_mark+0x15c/0x19c)
  [  138.964000]  r6:e3db94f0 r5:e3017540 r4:e41882a0 r3:271aed08
  [  138.972000] [<c0173988>] (fsnotify_destroy_mark+0x0/0x19c) from
  [<c0175890>] (sys_inotify_rm_watch+0x88/0xc0)
  [  138.980000]  r8:c004aba8 r7:e3017540 r6:e41882a0 r5:00000000
  r4:e3017300
  [  138.988000] r3:00000000
  [  138.988000] [<c0175808>] (sys_inotify_rm_watch+0x0/0xc0) from
  [<c004a920>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x30

So we can see inside the fat_detach function we are accessing illegal
inode->i_sb->s_fs_info and we end up in above crash.
====================================================================
To solve this race, we must have some sort of serialized access to
superblock structure in umount path and fsnotification path. Now since
the umount path takes an exclusive lock on s_umount of superblock.
So if umount is in progress, this lock will not be free.

Hence we may try to take a shared access to super block's s_umount lock
inside the inotify_rm_watch() & if lock is free, means no one is doing
write operation on this superblock. So we can then just go ahead and
then before calling iput on the concerned inode, first we should check
whether this inode's superblock is still valid( e.g s_count is >= 1) or not.
So based on this condition we can choose our action and prevent the race.

Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Kumar <jangra.pankaj9@...il.com>
---
 fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c |   21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
 fs/notify/mark.c                 |    8 ++++++--
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c b/fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c
index d42ea9b..34bd371 100644
--- a/fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c
+++ b/fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c
@@ -811,7 +811,26 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(inotify_rm_watch, int, fd, __s32, wd)
 
 	ret = 0;
 
-	fsnotify_destroy_mark(&i_mark->fsn_mark, group);
+	/**
+	 * Lets check if this event is for an Inode change, if so
+	 * let us take a s_umount lock for inode's superblock, so
+	 * so that if superblock is being destroyed, the access to
+	 * inode->i_sb must be either a valid super_block or not a
+	 * valid one.
+	 * Since it can race with the umount path of superblock and
+	 * fsnotification path where it will call iput(inode) which
+	 * might lead us to the kernel oops.
+	 */
+	if (i_mark->fsn_mark.flags & FSNOTIFY_MARK_FLAG_INODE) {
+		struct inode *inode;
+		inode = i_mark->fsn_mark.i.inode;
+		if (inode) {
+			down_read(&inode->i_sb->s_umount);
+			fsnotify_destroy_mark(&i_mark->fsn_mark, group);
+			up_read(&inode->i_sb->s_umount);
+		}
+	} else
+		fsnotify_destroy_mark(&i_mark->fsn_mark, group);
 
 	/* match ref taken by inotify_idr_find */
 	fsnotify_put_mark(&i_mark->fsn_mark);
diff --git a/fs/notify/mark.c b/fs/notify/mark.c
index fc6b49b..5a81d6c 100644
--- a/fs/notify/mark.c
+++ b/fs/notify/mark.c
@@ -150,8 +150,12 @@ void fsnotify_destroy_mark_locked(struct fsnotify_mark *mark,
 
 	spin_unlock(&mark->lock);
 
-	if (inode && (mark->flags & FSNOTIFY_MARK_FLAG_OBJECT_PINNED))
-		iput(inode);
+	if (inode && (mark->flags & FSNOTIFY_MARK_FLAG_OBJECT_PINNED)) {
+		/* Lets check if inode belongs to a valid super block or not. */
+		if (inode->i_sb && inode->i_sb->s_count > 0)
+			iput(inode);
+	}
+
 	/* release lock temporarily */
 	mutex_unlock(&group->mark_mutex);
 
-- 
1.7.9.5

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