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Message-ID: <20121101162901.GE13132@srcf.ucam.org>
Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2012 16:29:01 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@...hat.com>
To: Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>, Oliver Neukum <oneukum@...e.de>,
Chris Friesen <chris.friesen@...band.com>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
On Thu, Nov 01, 2012 at 03:06:54PM +0000, Alan Cox wrote:
> > The entire point of this feature is that it's no longer possible to turn
> > a privileged user exploit into a full system exploit. Gaining admin
> > access on Windows 8 doesn't permit you to install a persistent backdoor,
>
> Really, that would be a first. Do you have a detailed knowledge of
> windows 8 actual security ?
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/hh848061%28v=vs.85%29.aspx
> > unless there's some way to circumvent that. Which there is, if you can
> > drop a small Linux distribution onto the ESP and use a signed, trusted
> > bootloader to boot a signed, trusted kernel that then resumes from an
> > unsigned, untrusted hibernate image. So we have to ensure that that's
> > impossible.
>
> Well if you want to make Linux entirely robust Red Hat could start
> helping with some of the 6000 odd coverity matches some of which will
> most certainly turn out to be real flaws.
Sure, bugs should be fixed.
--
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@...f.ucam.org
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