linux-kernel - Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support

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Message-ID: <20121102163302.GA6080@elf.ucw.cz>
Date:	Fri, 2 Nov 2012 17:33:02 +0100
From:	Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To:	Chris Friesen <chris.friesen@...band.com>
Cc:	Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>, Oliver Neukum <oneukum@...e.de>,
	Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
	Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support

On Thu 2012-11-01 15:02:25, Chris Friesen wrote:
> On 11/01/2012 02:27 PM, Pavel Machek wrote:
> 
> >Could someone write down exact requirements for Linux kernel to be signed by Microsoft?
> >Because thats apparently what you want, and I don't think crippling kexec/suspend is
> >enough.
> 
> As I understand it, the kernel won't be signed by Microsoft.

> Rather, the bootloader will be signed by Microsoft and the vendors
> will be the ones that refuse to sign a kernel unless it is
> reasonably assured that it won't be used as an attack vector.

Yes. So can someone write down what "used as an attack vector" means?

Because, AFAICT, Linux kernel is _designed_ to work as an attact
vector. We intentionally support wine, and want to keep that support.

> With secure boot enabled, then the kernel should refuse to let an
> unsigned kexec load new images, and kexec itself should refuse to
> load unsigned images.  Also the kernel would need to sign its
> "suspend-to-disk" images and refuse to resume unsigned images.

I believe that attacking Windows using wine is easier than using
suspend-to-disk.

									Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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