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Message-ID: <87liejacix.fsf@xmission.com>
Date: Fri, 02 Nov 2012 15:03:02 -0700
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>, Oliver Neukum <oneukum@...e.de>,
Chris Friesen <chris.friesen@...band.com>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org> writes:
> On Fri, Nov 02, 2012 at 01:49:25AM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>
>> When the goal is to secure Linux I don't see how any of this helps.
>> Windows 8 compromises are already available so if we turn most of these
>> arguments around I am certain clever attackers can go through windows to
>> run compromised kernel on a linux system, at least as easily as the
>> reverse.
>
> And if any of them are used to attack Linux, we'd expect those versions
> of Windows to be blacklisted.
I fail to see the logic here. It is ok to trust Microsofts signing key
because after I have been p0wned they will blacklist the version of
windows that has was used to compromise my system?
A key revokation will help me when my system is p0wned how?
I don't want my system p0wned in the first place and I don't want to run
windows. Why should I trust Microsoft's signing key?
Eric
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