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Message-ID: <20121105123638.GA4374@srcf.ucam.org>
Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2012 12:36:38 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Chris Friesen <chris.friesen@...band.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>, Oliver Neukum <oneukum@...e.de>,
Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
On Mon, Nov 05, 2012 at 09:20:17AM +0100, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Sun, 2012-11-04 at 13:52 +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > You don't get to punt on making the kernel secure by simply asserting
> > that some other system can be secure instead. The chain of trust needs
> > to go all the way back - if your security model is based on all installs
> > needing a physically present end user, all installs need a physically
> > present end user. That's not acceptable, so we need a different security
> > model.
>
> I didn't. I advocated a simple security model which you asserted
> wouldn't allow unattended installs, so I explained how they could be
> done.
You've explained that a hypothetical piece of software could handle key
provisioning without providing any explanation for how it would be able
to do so in a secure manner.
--
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@...f.ucam.org
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