linux-kernel - [RESEND PATCH V3] binfmt_elf.c: use get_random

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Message-ID: <5099FBAA.6000200@oracle.com>
Date:	Wed, 07 Nov 2012 14:11:54 +0800
From:	Jeff Liu <jeff.liu@...cle.com>
To:	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
CC:	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	Andreas Dilger <aedilger@...il.com>,
	John Sobecki <john.sobecki@...cle.com>,
	"viro@...iv.linux.org.uk" <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>,
	"arnd@...db.de" <arnd@...db.de>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
	"Ted Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
	"gregkh@...uxfoundation.org" <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	jakub@...hat.com, drepper@...hat.com,
	"linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [RESEND PATCH V3] binfmt_elf.c: use get_random_int() to fix entropy
 depleting

Hello,

This is the revised patch for fix entropy depleting.

Changes:
--------
v3->v2:
- Tweak code comments of random_stack_user().
- Remove redundant bits mask and shift upon the random variable.

v2->v1:
Fix random copy to check up buffer length that are not 4-byte multiples.

v2 can be found at:
http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-fsdevel/msg59418.html
v1 can be found at:
http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-fsdevel/msg59128.html

Many thanks to Andreas, Andrew as well as Kees for reviewing the patch of past!
-Jeff


Entropy is quickly depleted under normal operations like ls(1), cat(1),
etc...  between 2.6.30 to current mainline, for instance:

$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail
3428
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail
2911
$cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail
2620

We observed this problem has been occurring since 2.6.30 with
fs/binfmt_elf.c: create_elf_tables()->get_random_bytes(), introduced by
f06295b44c296c8f ("ELF: implement AT_RANDOM for glibc PRNG seeding").

/*
 * Generate 16 random bytes for userspace PRNG seeding.
 */
get_random_bytes(k_rand_bytes, sizeof(k_rand_bytes));

The patch introduces a wrapper around get_random_int() which has lower
overhead than calling get_random_bytes() directly.

With this patch applied:
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail
2731
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail
2802
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail
2878

Analyzed by John Sobecki.

Signed-off-by: Jie Liu <jeff.liu@...cle.com>
Cc: John Sobecki <john.sobecki@...cle.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andreas Dilger <aedilger@...il.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnn@...db.de>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@...hat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>

---
 fs/binfmt_elf.c |   22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
index fbd9f60..b6c59f6 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct pt_regs *regs);
 static int load_elf_library(struct file *);
 static unsigned long elf_map(struct file *, unsigned long, struct elf_phdr *,
 				int, int, unsigned long);
+static void randomize_stack_user(unsigned char *buf, size_t nbytes);
 
 /*
  * If we don't support core dumping, then supply a NULL so we
@@ -200,7 +201,7 @@ create_elf_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct elfhdr *exec,
 	/*
 	 * Generate 16 random bytes for userspace PRNG seeding.
 	 */
-	get_random_bytes(k_rand_bytes, sizeof(k_rand_bytes));
+	randomize_stack_user(k_rand_bytes, sizeof(k_rand_bytes));
 	u_rand_bytes = (elf_addr_t __user *)
 		       STACK_ALLOC(p, sizeof(k_rand_bytes));
 	if (__copy_to_user(u_rand_bytes, k_rand_bytes, sizeof(k_rand_bytes)))
@@ -558,6 +559,25 @@ static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
 #endif
 }
 
+/*
+ * Use get_random_int() to implement AT_RANDOM while avoiding depletion
+ * of the entropy pool.
+ */
+static void randomize_stack_user(unsigned char *buf, size_t nbytes)
+{
+	unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+	while (nbytes) {
+		unsigned int random_variable;
+		size_t chunk = min(nbytes, sizeof(unsigned int));
+
+		random_variable = get_random_int();
+		memcpy(p, &random_variable, chunk);
+		p += chunk;
+		nbytes -= chunk;
+	}
+}
+
 static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	struct file *interpreter = NULL; /* to shut gcc up */
-- 
1.7.4.1
--
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