linux-kernel - Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket

[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20121108111928.27911a63@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk>
Date:	Thu, 8 Nov 2012 11:19:28 +0000
From:	Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To:	James Courtier-Dutton <james.dutton@...il.com>
Cc:	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
	Olivier Galibert <galibert@...ox.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fw@...eb.enyo.de>,
	Chris Friesen <chris.friesen@...band.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
	Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>, Oliver Neukum <oneukum@...e.de>,
	Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...il.com>,
	LKML Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support

> You have a fair chance of protecting via physical means (Locked rooms,
> Background checks on users etc.) of preventing a user with malicious intent
> to access the local machine.

So called "secure boot" doesn't deal with any kind of physical access,
which also means its useless if a device is lost and returned and you
don't know if it was in the hands of a third party.

> The first thing a computer does when switched on is run its first code
> instructions. Commonly referred to as the BIOS.

A good deal more complicated than that. However the signing in hardware
and early boot up on a lot of devices already goes as far as the BIOS if
the system has BIOS or EFI if it doesn't. You also have all the devices
to deal with.

> Normally digital signatures would examine the binary, ensure the signature
> matches, and then run the code contained in it.

No - it's a good deal more complicated than that too.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/