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Message-Id: <1353322222-27060-1-git-send-email-ebiederm@xmission.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2012 02:50:17 -0800
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
To: <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: Linux Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Subject: [PATCH review 1/6] vfs: Allow chroot if you have CAP_SYS_CHROOT in your user namespace
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Once you are confined to a user namespace applications can not gain
privilege and escape the user namespace so there is no longer a reason
to restrict chroot.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
---
fs/open.c | 2 +-
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 59071f5..182d866 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chroot, const char __user *, filename)
goto dput_and_out;
error = -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
+ if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
goto dput_and_out;
error = security_path_chroot(&path);
if (error)
--
1.7.5.4
--
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