linux-kernel - Re: [RFC] Capabilities still can't be inherited by normal programs

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Date:	Mon, 10 Dec 2012 08:36:09 -0600
From:	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
To:	"Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@...nel.org>
Cc:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...onical.com>,
	Markku Savela <msa@...h.iki.fi>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Capabilities still can't be inherited by normal programs

Quoting Andrew G. Morgan (morgan@...nel.org):
> > It breaks down because, currently, users with nonzero pI have no
> > direct ability to wield the capabilities.  That means that every
> > single binary with fI bits set needs to be as careful as a setuid-root
> > binary to avoid leaking privilege to the caller.  (Obviously, binaries
> > with fP set need to be careful.  IMO binaries with only fI set should
> > not need to exercise any particular care to defend themselves from
> > their callers.)
> 
> True.

Uh, I disagree.  Not true.

(I suspect Andrew meant True to the first two sentences, not the
last parenthesized one?)

-serge
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