[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJ0S+rJ9+LsMzoDYmAUZjGU-NuN1Y0DwHN_MatbXG02jg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2012 12:17:17 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
"Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@...nel.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...onical.com>,
Markku Savela <msa@...h.iki.fi>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Capabilities still can't be inherited by normal programs
On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 11:55 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
> Write a daemon. Rig up wrappers for each setuid program to instead
> call into that daemon and have that daemon invoke the privileged
> program on behalf of the caller, with a sanitized environment. Be
> annoyed by a few items on the "linux plumber's wish list" that make
> this rather difficult right now.
FWIW, this is something we'd like to do in Chrome OS. Dealing with
fs-attrs has traditionally been a pain, so this kind of simple passing
down of privilege would be much nicer. It means we'd have a
programmatic way to decide what privs a helper has, rather than having
to represent it in some way on-disk.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists