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Date:	Fri, 11 Jan 2013 04:18:22 +0800
From:	Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:	Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@...hat.com>
CC:	Gleb Natapov <gleb@...hat.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, KVM <kvm@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 5/5] KVM: x86: improve reexecute_instruction

On 01/11/2013 03:48 AM, Marcelo Tosatti wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 11, 2013 at 02:05:33AM +0800, Xiao Guangrong wrote:
>> On 01/11/2013 01:26 AM, Marcelo Tosatti wrote:
>>> On Tue, Jan 08, 2013 at 02:38:36PM +0800, Xiao Guangrong wrote:
>>>> The current reexecute_instruction can not well detect the failed instruction
>>>> emulation. It allows guest to retry all the instructions except it accesses
>>>> on error pfn
>>>>
>>>> For example, some cases are nested-write-protect - if the page we want to
>>>> write is used as PDE but it chains to itself. Under this case, we should
>>>> stop the emulation and report the case to userspace
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |    7 +++++++
>>>>  arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h      |   27 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
>>>>  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              |    8 +++++++-
>>>>  3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>>>> index c431b33..d6ab8d2 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>>>> @@ -502,6 +502,13 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
>>>>  		u64 msr_val;
>>>>  		struct gfn_to_hva_cache data;
>>>>  	} pv_eoi;
>>>> +
>>>> +	/*
>>>> +	 * Indicate whether the access faults on its page table in guest
>>>> +	 * which is set when fix page fault and used to detect unhandeable
>>>> +	 * instruction.
>>>> +	 */
>>>> +	bool write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable;
>>>>  };
>>>>
>>>>  struct kvm_lpage_info {
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h
>>>> index 67b390d..df50560 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h
>>>> @@ -497,26 +497,34 @@ out_gpte_changed:
>>>>   * created when kvm establishes shadow page table that stop kvm using large
>>>>   * page size. Do it early can avoid unnecessary #PF and emulation.
>>>>   *
>>>> + * @write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable will return true if the fault gfn is
>>>> + * currently used as its page table.
>>>> + *
>>>>   * Note: the PDPT page table is not checked for PAE-32 bit guest. It is ok
>>>>   * since the PDPT is always shadowed, that means, we can not use large page
>>>>   * size to map the gfn which is used as PDPT.
>>>>   */
>>>>  static bool
>>>>  FNAME(is_self_change_mapping)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>>>> -			      struct guest_walker *walker, int user_fault)
>>>> +			      struct guest_walker *walker, int user_fault,
>>>> +			      bool *write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable)
>>>>  {
>>>>  	int level;
>>>>  	gfn_t mask = ~(KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(walker->level) - 1);
>>>> +	bool self_changed = false;
>>>>
>>>>  	if (!(walker->pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK ||
>>>>  	      (!is_write_protection(vcpu) && !user_fault)))
>>>>  		return false;
>>>>
>>>> -	for (level = walker->level; level <= walker->max_level; level++)
>>>> -		if (!((walker->gfn ^ walker->table_gfn[level - 1]) & mask))
>>>> -			return true;
>>>> +	for (level = walker->level; level <= walker->max_level; level++) {
>>>> +		gfn_t gfn = walker->gfn ^ walker->table_gfn[level - 1];
>>>> +
>>>> +		self_changed |= !(gfn & mask);
>>>> +		*write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable |= !gfn;
>>>> +	}
>>>>
>>>> -	return false;
>>>> +	return self_changed;
>>>>  }
>>>>
>>>>  /*
>>>> @@ -544,7 +552,7 @@ static int FNAME(page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr, u32 error_code,
>>>>  	int level = PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL;
>>>>  	int force_pt_level;
>>>>  	unsigned long mmu_seq;
>>>> -	bool map_writable;
>>>> +	bool map_writable, is_self_change_mapping;
>>>>
>>>>  	pgprintk("%s: addr %lx err %x\n", __func__, addr, error_code);
>>>>
>>>> @@ -572,9 +580,14 @@ static int FNAME(page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr, u32 error_code,
>>>>  		return 0;
>>>>  	}
>>>>
>>>> +	vcpu->arch.write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable = false;
>>>> +
>>>> +	is_self_change_mapping = FNAME(is_self_change_mapping)(vcpu,
>>>> +	      &walker, user_fault, &vcpu->arch.write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable);
>>>> +
>>>>  	if (walker.level >= PT_DIRECTORY_LEVEL)
>>>>  		force_pt_level = mapping_level_dirty_bitmap(vcpu, walker.gfn)
>>>> -		   || FNAME(is_self_change_mapping)(vcpu, &walker, user_fault);
>>>> +		   || is_self_change_mapping;
>>>>  	else
>>>>  		force_pt_level = 1;
>>>>  	if (!force_pt_level) {
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>>>> index 6f13e03..2957012 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>>>> @@ -4810,7 +4810,13 @@ static bool reexecute_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t cr2)
>>>>  	 * guest to let CPU execute the instruction.
>>>>  	 */
>>>>  	kvm_mmu_unprotect_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(gpa));
>>>> -	return true;
>>>> +
>>>> +	/*
>>>> +	 * If the access faults on its page table, it can not
>>>> +	 * be fixed by unprotecting shadow page and it should
>>>> +	 * be reported to userspace.
>>>> +	 */
>>>> +	return !vcpu->arch.write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable;
>>>>  }
>>>
>>> This sounds wrong: only reporting emulation failure in case 
>>> of a write fault to shadow pagetable? 
>>
>> We suppose unprotecting target-gfn can avoid emulation, the same
>> as current code. :(
> 
> Current code treats access to non-mapped guest address as indication to
> exit reporting emulation failure.
> 
> The patch above restricts emulation failure reporting to when
> write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable = true.

In the patch 4:

+	/*
+	 * If the instruction failed on the error pfn, it can not be fixed,
+	 * report the error to userspace.
+	 */
+	if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn))
+		return false;
+
+	kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);

That means, two cases can cause failure fail:

1): access on non-mapped guest address (The same as the current code)
2): !vcpu->arch.write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable (The new case added in this patch)

Hmm, or i missed something?


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