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Message-ID: <87mww8lnwi.fsf@xmission.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2013 15:16:13 -0800
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, pjones@...hat.com, hpa@...or.com,
dhowells@...hat.com, jwboyer@...hat.com,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...el.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] binfmt_elf: Verify signature of signed elf binary
Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com> writes:
> On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 05:35:23PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>> On Tue, 2013-01-15 at 16:34 -0500, Vivek Goyal wrote:
>> > If a binary is signed, verify its signature. If signature is not valid, do
>> > not allow execution. If binary is not signed, execution is allowed
>> > unconditionally.
>>
>> Basically you're building the policy into the executable. Anyone can
>> rebuild the executable and, without signing it, install/replace an
>> existing one. How is this safe? The signature verification policy
>> needs to be defined independently of the executable.
>
> Upon signature verification this executable will also acquire a new
> capability(say CAP_SIGNED). And some of the services can be allowed only
> if process has that new capability. (TODO item)
Just a quick segway. The ptrace problem is solved by existing
mechanisms if you have a capability that other binaries don't have.
Eric
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