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Message-ID: <20130117180407.27885.54342.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2013 18:04:07 +0000
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: dmitry.kasatkin@...el.com, zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...ux-nfs.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] KEYS: Add a 'trusted' flag and a 'trusted only' flag
Add KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED to indicate that a key either comes from a trusted source
or had a cryptographic signature chain that led back to a trusted key the
kernel already possessed.
Add KEY_FLAGS_TRUSTED_ONLY to indicate that a keyring will only accept links to
keys marked with KEY_FLAGS_TRUSTED.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
include/linux/key-type.h | 1 +
include/linux/key.h | 3 +++
kernel/system_keyring.c | 4 +++-
security/keys/key.c | 8 ++++++++
security/keys/keyring.c | 4 ++++
5 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h
index 518a53a..f942b2d 100644
--- a/include/linux/key-type.h
+++ b/include/linux/key-type.h
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ struct key_preparsed_payload {
const void *data; /* Raw data */
size_t datalen; /* Raw datalen */
size_t quotalen; /* Quota length for proposed payload */
+ bool trusted; /* True if key is trusted */
};
typedef int (*request_key_actor_t)(struct key_construction *key,
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 4dfde11..0b32a09 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -162,6 +162,8 @@ struct key {
#define KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE 5 /* set if key is negative */
#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR 6 /* set if key can be cleared by root without permission */
#define KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED 7 /* set if key has been invalidated */
+#define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED 8 /* set if key is trusted */
+#define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY 9 /* set if keyring only accepts links to trusted keys */
/* the description string
* - this is used to match a key against search criteria
@@ -203,6 +205,7 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,
#define KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA 0x0000 /* add to quota, reject if would overrun */
#define KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN 0x0001 /* add to quota, permit even if overrun */
#define KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA 0x0002 /* not in quota */
+#define KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED 0x0004 /* Key should be flagged as trusted */
extern void key_revoke(struct key *key);
extern void key_invalidate(struct key *key);
diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c
index a3ca76f..dae8778 100644
--- a/kernel/system_keyring.c
+++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
if (IS_ERR(system_trusted_keyring))
panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n");
+ set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &system_trusted_keyring->flags);
return 0;
}
@@ -82,7 +83,8 @@ static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void)
plen,
(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW,
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+ KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED);
if (IS_ERR(key))
pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
PTR_ERR(key));
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 8fb7c7b..f3de9e4 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA))
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA;
+ if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED)
+ key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED;
memset(&key->type_data, 0, sizeof(key->type_data));
@@ -813,6 +815,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
prep.data = payload;
prep.datalen = plen;
prep.quotalen = ktype->def_datalen;
+ prep.trusted = flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED;
if (ktype->preparse) {
ret = ktype->preparse(&prep);
if (ret < 0) {
@@ -826,6 +829,11 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
goto error_free_prep;
}
+ key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+ if (!prep.trusted && test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring->flags))
+ goto error_free_prep;
+ flags |= prep.trusted ? KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED : 0;
+
ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, ktype, description, &prealloc);
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 6ece7f2..f18d7ff 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1006,6 +1006,10 @@ int key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
key_check(keyring);
key_check(key);
+ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring->flags) &&
+ !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED, &key->flags))
+ return -EPERM;
+
ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type, key->description, &prealloc);
if (ret == 0) {
ret = __key_link_check_live_key(keyring, key);
--
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