linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 2/3] KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing

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Message-ID: <30183.1358457628@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date:	Thu, 17 Jan 2013 21:20:28 +0000
From:	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc:	dhowells@...hat.com, dmitry.kasatkin@...el.com,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...ux-nfs.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing

Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:

> Lets assume accepting built in keys should is acceptable for all use
> cases.  Adding additional keys from userspace is probably not acceptable
> for all use cases.  Those keys should be added to specific 'trusted'
> keyrings.
> 
> EVM and IMA-appraisal have separate keyrings for this reason.  I might
> be interested in allowing third party packages to be installed and
> executed, but that doesn't imply that a security.evm extended attribute,
> signed by a third party application, is acceptable.

We should probably look at using the capability of X.509 certificates to
indicate what a key may be used for and noting that in the public_key struct.

David
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