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Message-ID: <51027950.2080209@atsec.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2013 13:23:44 +0100
From: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@...ec.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
CC: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Kyle McMartin <kyle@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
rusty@...tcorp.com.au, jstancek@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] MODSIGN: flag modules that use cryptoapi and only panic
if those are unsigned
On 25.01.2013 04:20:07, +0100, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org> wrote:
Hi Matthew,
> On Fri, Jan 25, 2013 at 12:14:54AM +0000, David Howells wrote:
>
>> You can't rely on someone trying to sneak a dodgy crypto module in to set the
>> flag when they build it. The detection thus needs to be done in the kernel
>> during the module load.
>>
>> Can you search the module image for "crypto_register_" I wonder? If that's
>> there, it's a crypto module.
>
> If you're trying to protect against malice rather than accident, what's
> going to stop the module from just finding and modifying data structures
> itself? If you want to panic if you've just loaded something that might
> compromise your crypto implementations, you've got to panic on all
> unsigned module loads.
That is the issue here. We want to protect against accidental changes
and modifications. Malicious attacks will never be caught by the FIPS
requirements where a module is allowed to check itself.
If an attacker is able to load any kind of kernel module, we have lost.
Period.
Thus, from a FIPS point of view the latest patch from Kyle is also
appropriate, provided the concerns I raised there are covered.
Ciao
Stephan
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