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Message-ID: <00780235-deac-4f80-b936-867834e05661@email.android.com>
Date: Fri, 08 Feb 2013 11:17:24 -0800
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
CC: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot
We already have CAP_RAWIO for this in mainline; I am not sure if this should be harder than that...
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>Writing to MSRs should not be allowed unless CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL is
>set since it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode.
>
>Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>---
>This would be used on top of Matthew Garrett's existing "Secure boot
>policy support" patch series.
>---
> arch/x86/kernel/msr.c | 7 +++++++
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
>index 4929502..adaab3d 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
>@@ -103,6 +103,9 @@ static ssize_t msr_write(struct file *file, const
>char __user *buf,
> int err = 0;
> ssize_t bytes = 0;
>
>+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
>+ return -EPERM;
>+
> if (count % 8)
> return -EINVAL; /* Invalid chunk size */
>
>@@ -150,6 +153,10 @@ static long msr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned
>int ioc, unsigned long arg)
> err = -EBADF;
> break;
> }
>+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) {
>+ err = -EPERM;
>+ break;
>+ }
> if (copy_from_user(®s, uregs, sizeof regs)) {
> err = -EFAULT;
> break;
--
Sent from my mobile phone. Please excuse brevity and lack of formatting.
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