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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJnLY6Qp3J6HBpVg-AdUGdKYm-e4wErZO3=NuRo04ajvg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 11:18:54 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot
No. CAP_RAWIO is for reading. Writing needs a much stronger check.
-Kees
On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 11:17 AM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com> wrote:
> We already have CAP_RAWIO for this in mainline; I am not sure if this should be harder than that...
>
> Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>
>>Writing to MSRs should not be allowed unless CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL is
>>set since it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode.
>>
>>Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>>---
>>This would be used on top of Matthew Garrett's existing "Secure boot
>>policy support" patch series.
>>---
>> arch/x86/kernel/msr.c | 7 +++++++
>> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
>>
>>diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
>>index 4929502..adaab3d 100644
>>--- a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
>>+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
>>@@ -103,6 +103,9 @@ static ssize_t msr_write(struct file *file, const
>>char __user *buf,
>> int err = 0;
>> ssize_t bytes = 0;
>>
>>+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
>>+ return -EPERM;
>>+
>> if (count % 8)
>> return -EINVAL; /* Invalid chunk size */
>>
>>@@ -150,6 +153,10 @@ static long msr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned
>>int ioc, unsigned long arg)
>> err = -EBADF;
>> break;
>> }
>>+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) {
>>+ err = -EPERM;
>>+ break;
>>+ }
>> if (copy_from_user(®s, uregs, sizeof regs)) {
>> err = -EFAULT;
>> break;
>
> --
> Sent from my mobile phone. Please excuse brevity and lack of formatting.
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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