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Message-ID: <1360351629.18083.15.camel@x230.lan>
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 19:27:09 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
CC: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot
On Fri, 2013-02-08 at 11:21 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 11:17 AM, Matthew Garrett
> <matthew.garrett@...ula.com> wrote:
> > On Fri, 2013-02-08 at 11:12 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> Writing to MSRs should not be allowed unless CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL is
> >> set since it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode.
> >
> > Willing to buy this, but do you have a description of one potential
> > approach? We should probably also figure out what's writing to MSRs at
> > the moment (anything other than energy_perf_bias?) and decide what the
> > best thing to do there is.
>
> Yes, change the SYSENTER entry point to where-ever you like. There are
> examples already written:
> http://grsecurity.net/~spender/msr32.c
Cool. Yup, this sounds like a good plan.
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