[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20130208230655.GB28990@pd.tnic>
Date: Sat, 9 Feb 2013 00:06:55 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot
On Fri, Feb 08, 2013 at 02:30:52PM -0800, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> Also, keep in mind that there is a very simple way to deny MSR access
> completely, which is to not include the driver in your kernel (and not
> allow module loading, but if you can load modules you can just load a
> module to muck with whatever MSR you want.)
I was contemplating that too. What is the use case of having
msr.ko in a secure boot environment? Isn't that an all-no-tools,
you-can't-do-sh*t-except-what-you're-explicitly-allowed-to environment which
simply doesn't need to write MSRs in the first place?
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Sent from a fat crate under my desk. Formatting is fine.
--
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists