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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+xvJ3L5ejxtZ-Jw3F6rV7OsrE0_HZCGu_er0rH2_PwKA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 22:45:35 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot
On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 5:29 PM, Matthew Garrett
<matthew.garrett@...ula.com> wrote:
> On Fri, 2013-02-08 at 17:22 -0800, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
>
>> You don't have to build the kernel twice to exclude a loadable module.
>
> I guess you could just strip the signatures off any modules you don't
> want to support under Secure Boot, but that breaks some other use cases.
Also, _reading_ MSRs from userspace arguably has utility that doesn't
compromise ring-0. So excluding the driver entirely seems like
overkill.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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