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Message-Id: <20130212203416.600791519@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 12:36:59 -0800
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>,
Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@...hat.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: [ 16/22] net: sctp: sctp_endpoint_free: zero out secret key data
3.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>
[ Upstream commit b5c37fe6e24eec194bb29d22fdd55d73bcc709bf ]
On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material
should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do
with e.g. auth keys when released.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
net/sctp/endpointola.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c
+++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
@@ -248,6 +248,8 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endp
/* Final destructor for endpoint. */
static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
{
+ int i;
+
SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return);
/* Free up the HMAC transform. */
@@ -270,6 +272,9 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct
sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue);
sctp_bind_addr_free(&ep->base.bind_addr);
+ for (i = 0; i < SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS; ++i)
+ memset(&ep->secret_key[i], 0, SCTP_SECRET_SIZE);
+
/* Remove and free the port */
if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash)
sctp_put_port(ep->base.sk);
--
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