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Message-ID: <511AE2CC.5040705@zytor.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 16:48:12 -0800
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
CC: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot
On 02/09/2013 07:11 AM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Sat, 2013-02-09 at 10:29 +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
>> On Fri, Feb 08, 2013 at 10:45:35PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> Also, _reading_ MSRs from userspace arguably has utility that doesn't
>>> compromise ring-0.
>>
>> And to come back to the original question: what is that utility, who
>> would need it on a secure boot system and why?
>
> Things like Turbostat are useful, although perhaps that information
> should be exposed in a better way.
>
OK... what none of this gets into:
Why should CAP_RAWIO be allowed on a secure boot system, when there are
2^n known ways of compromise a system with CAP_RAWIO?
-hpa
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