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Message-ID: <CALLzPKbj33dQ36tcwip_LKCOXgA6GcBDbSc5s4y4cYyv2=s=nw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2013 15:36:45 +0200
From: "Kasatkin, Dmitry" <dmitry.kasatkin@...el.com>
To: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] ima: Support appraise_type=imasig_optional
It should not be the only line in the policy.
Can you share full policy?
Thanks,
Dmitry
On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 3:29 PM, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 02:14:55PM +0200, Kasatkin, Dmitry wrote:
>> Hello Vivek,
>>
>> Can you please send to us how your IMA policy looks like.
>
> Hi Dmitry,
>
> For testing purposes, I am using following.
>
> appraise fowner=0 func=BPRM_CHECK appraise_type=imasig_optional
>
> I set this using /sys/kernel/security/policy interface after boot.
>
> Thanks
> Vivek
>
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Dmitry
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 8:57 PM, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com> wrote:
>> > On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 01:52:03PM -0500, Vivek Goyal wrote:
>> >> On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 12:14:07PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>> >>
>> >> [..]
>> >> > > > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
>> >> > > > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
>> >> > > > > @@ -124,19 +124,26 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>> >> > > > > enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
>> >> > > > > const char *op = "appraise_data";
>> >> > > > > char *cause = "unknown";
>> >> > > > > - int rc;
>> >> > > > > + int rc, audit_info = 0;
>> >> > > > >
>> >> > > > > if (!ima_appraise)
>> >> > > > > return 0;
>> >> > > > > - if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
>> >> > > > > + if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
>> >> > > > > + /* getxattr not supported. file couldn't have been signed */
>> >> > > > > + if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_OPTIONAL)
>> >> > > > > + return INTEGRITY_PASS;
>> >> > > > > return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
>> >> > > > > + }
>> >> > > > >
>> >> > > >
>> >> > > > Please don't change the result of the appraisal like this. A single
>> >> > > > change can be made towards the bottom of process_measurement().
>> >> > >
>> >> > > I don't want to pass integrity in all cases of INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. So
>> >> > > I can probably maintain a bool variable, say pass_appraisal, and set
>> >> > > that here and at the end of function, parse that variable and change
>> >> > > the status accordingly.
>> >> >
>> >> > process_measurement() is the only caller of ima_appraise_measurement().
>> >> > Leave the results of ima_appraise_measurement() alone. There's already
>> >> > code at the end of process_measurement() which decides what to return.
>> >> > Just modify it based on the appraisal results.
>> >>
>> >
>> > If we do this, audit logs will be filled with integrity unknown failures.
>> > As each unsigned executable file will fail appraisal with INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN
>> > and an audit message will be logged.
>> >
>> > Thanks
>> > Vivek
>> > --
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