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Message-ID: <511BCB6E.8080102@zytor.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2013 09:20:46 -0800
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
CC: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot
On 02/12/2013 10:41 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Tue, 2013-02-12 at 22:33 -0800, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
>
>> That is just batshit crazy. If you have CAP_SYS_RAWIO you can do iopl()
>> which means you can reprogram your northbridge, at which point you most
>> definitely *can* modify the running kernel.
>
> Well right, that's the point of this patchset - it adds some extra
> permission checks to some of the existing CAP_SYS_RAWIO checks.
> CAP_SYS_RAWIO hasn't meant "I can perform arbitrary pio and mmio" for
> years - it means "I can do things that might maybe break something
> somehow". So sure, removing CAP_SYS_RAWIO would give us basically all
> the security we want in a secure boot environment, but it would also
> block things that we *want* to work.
>
So, let 's see...
Problem:
Someone adds SYS_CAP_RAWIO to some places it definitely does not
belong.
Solution:
Break all the *appropriate* (as defined)uses of SYS_CAP_RAWIO?
What the heck?
-hpa
--
H. Peter Anvin, Intel Open Source Technology Center
I work for Intel. I don't speak on their behalf.
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