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Message-ID: <1360781490.18083.45.camel@x230.lan>
Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2013 18:51:30 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
CC: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot
On Wed, 2013-02-13 at 10:44 -0800, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> So people have piggybacked complete inappropriate junk onto
> CAP_SYS_RAWIO. Great. What the hell do we do now? We can't break
> apart CAP_SYS_RAWIO because we don't have hierarchical capabilities.
Yeah. Like I said, it's approximately useless.
> We thus have a bunch of unpalatable choices, **all of which are wrong**.
>
> This, incidentally, is *exactly* the reason I object to
> CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL as well... it describes a usage model, not a resource.
Like I said, I'm not wed to a capability-based model. However, it does
seem marginally more attractive than sprinkling if (!secure_boot) all
over the place. If anyone has alternatives, this would be a great time
to raise them.
--
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@...f.ucam.org
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