linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 00/15] Secure boot policy support

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Message-ID: <1361128775.20542.6.camel@scapa>
Date:	Sun, 17 Feb 2013 20:19:35 +0100
From:	Yves-Alexis Perez <corsac@...ian.org>
To:	Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/15] Secure boot policy support

On lun., 2013-01-28 at 11:42 -0500, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> Secure boot makes it possible to ensure that the on-disk representation of
> the kernel hasn't been modified. This can be sidestepped if the in-memory
> representation can be trivially altered. We currently have a large number
> of interfaces that permit root to perform effectively arbitrary
> modifications to the kernel, so this patchset introduces a new capability
> ("CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL") that controls whether or not these features are
> available. The aim is for this to be useful in any other situations where
> kernel integrity can be assured by some other mechanism rather than special
> casing UEFI.
> 
Wouldn't it make sense to prevent writing to MSRs too? Something like
c903f0456bc69176912dee6dd25c6a66ee1aed00 with CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL?

Regards,
-- 
Yves-Alexis

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