linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 2/2] ima: Support appraise_type=imasig

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Date:	Mon, 18 Feb 2013 13:21:14 -0500
From:	Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>
To:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc:	"Kasatkin, Dmitry" <dmitry.kasatkin@...el.com>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] ima: Support appraise_type=imasig_optional

On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 10:30:15AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Thu, 2013-02-14 at 10:03 -0500, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 05:27:01PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > 
> > [..]
> > > > Yep, I got that. Default policy gets overruled when a new policy is
> > > > loaded.
> > > > 
> > > > In secureboot mode, somehow above rule needs to take effect by default.
> > > > One option would be that kernel can enforce above rule.
> > > > (I guess by adding it to both default_list as well as policy list).
> > > 
> > > The default policy is empty, but can be replaced with boot command line
> > > options.  The existing options are ima_tcb and/ ima_appraise_tcb.
> > > Please feel free to define an additional policy.
> > 
> > I think just defining a new command line option is not sufficient
> > for secureboot use case.
> > 
> > - One can easily remove kernel command line option without breaking
> >   booting and easily bypass secureboot restrictions.
> 
> > - I guess this is one mandated rule by secureboot. There might still
> >   be a user policy which can co-exist with this rule.
> > 
> > So to me this is not a new policy. It is just one mandatory rule which
> > gets appended to any policy in secureboot mode. Think of it as mandatory
> > rule imposed by kernel for any policy user can define. And in secureboot
> > mode a user can not get rid of this rule. (Otherwise it breaks user
> > space signing and one can bypass secureboot and boot into unsigned
> > kernel).
> 
> Your rule allows both signed and unsigned files to be executed.  Signed
> files will just have more capabilities.  The ima_appraise_tcb option
> requires all files owned by root to be signed, otherwise access is
> denied.  The two policies simply can not co-exist.

Thinking loud. I guess we might have to extend ima policy/rules to allow
multiple appraise rules to co-exist. And access permission will finally
depend on if all the rules in same category return success.

Thanks
Vivek
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