linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 2/2] ima: add policy support for file system uuid

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Date:	Fri, 22 Feb 2013 02:39:43 -0800 (PST)
From:	David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>
To:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc:	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] ima: add policy support for file system uuid

On Thu, 21 Feb 2013, Mimi Zohar wrote:

> > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > > index 4adcd0f..23f49e3 100644
> > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > > @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
> > >  #include <linux/magic.h>
> > >  #include <linux/parser.h>
> > >  #include <linux/slab.h>
> > > +#include <linux/genhd.h>
> > >  
> > >  #include "ima.h"
> > >  
> > > @@ -25,6 +26,7 @@
> > >  #define IMA_FSMAGIC	0x0004
> > >  #define IMA_UID		0x0008
> > >  #define IMA_FOWNER	0x0010
> > > +#define IMA_FSUUID	0x0020
> > >  
> > >  #define UNKNOWN		0
> > >  #define MEASURE		0x0001	/* same as IMA_MEASURE */
> > > @@ -45,6 +47,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
> > >  	enum ima_hooks func;
> > >  	int mask;
> > >  	unsigned long fsmagic;
> > > +	u8 fsuuid[16];
> > >  	kuid_t uid;
> > >  	kuid_t fowner;
> > >  	struct {
> > > @@ -172,6 +175,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
> > >  	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
> > >  	    && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
> > >  		return false;
> > > +	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) &&
> > > +		memcmp(rule->fsuuid, inode->i_sb->s_uuid, sizeof(rule->fsuuid)))
> > > +		return false;
> > >  	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
> > >  		return false;
> > >  	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid))
> > > @@ -346,7 +352,7 @@ enum {
> > >  	Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
> > >  	Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
> > >  	Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner,
> > > -	Opt_appraise_type
> > > +	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid
> > >  };
> > >  
> > >  static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
> > > @@ -364,6 +370,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
> > >  	{Opt_func, "func=%s"},
> > >  	{Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
> > >  	{Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
> > > +	{Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"},
> > >  	{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
> > >  	{Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
> > >  	{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
> > > @@ -519,6 +526,19 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> > >  			if (!result)
> > >  				entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
> > >  			break;
> > > +		case Opt_fsuuid:
> > > +			ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
> > > +
> > > +			if (memchr_inv(entry->fsuuid, 0x00,
> > > +			    sizeof(entry->fsuuid))) {
> > > +				result = -EINVAL;
> > > +				break;
> > > +			}
> > > +
> > > +			part_pack_uuid(args[0].from, entry->fsuuid);
> > > +			entry->flags |= IMA_FSUUID;
> > > +			result = 0;
> > > +			break;
> > >  		case Opt_uid:
> > >  			ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from);
> > >  
> > 
> > We don't have part_pack_uuid() without CONFIG_BLOCK, so should this return 
> > -ENOTSUPP if that option is not enabled?
> 
> Yes, this problem showed up in Randy's randconfig.  He suggested moving
> part_pack_uuid() outside of the "ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK" to always make it
> visible - http://marc.info/?l=linux-next&m=136139276002173&w=2.
> 

Who's pushing this to linux-next?
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