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Message-ID: <20130226194123.GA16640@srcf.ucam.org>
Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2013 19:41:23 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
To: Florian Weimer <fw@...eb.enyo.de>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>,
Peter Jones <pjones@...hat.com>,
Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, keyrings@...ux-nfs.org,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Load keys from signed PE binaries
On Tue, Feb 26, 2013 at 08:30:17PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
> I'm sure many folks have read <http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/12368.html>
> ("Implementing UEFI Secure Boot in Fedora", 2012-30-05) and similar
> analysis and came away with the impression of a rather open, automated
> signing process, like we had/have for ActiveX controls and Java
> Webstart applications. This may have helped to increase acceptance of
> Microsoft Secure Boot in the technical community. But lately, in
> direct contradiction to earlier descriptions of the process, a lot of
> talk about "obligations" has appeared. I understand that you cannot
> go into specifics, but this situation is rather unfortunate for all of
> us.
It's open. If your code ends up signed and is then used to compromise
the security of other signed operating systems, you're likely to be
blacklisted. That can't surprise anyone, can it?
--
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@...f.ucam.org
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