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Date:	Mon, 25 Feb 2013 20:13:24 -0800
From:	Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
Cc:	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fw@...eb.enyo.de>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>,
	Peter Jones <pjones@...hat.com>,
	Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, keyrings@...ux-nfs.org,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Load keys from signed PE binaries

On Tue, Feb 26, 2013 at 04:04:56AM +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 07:54:16PM -0800, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Tue, Feb 26, 2013 at 03:38:04AM +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > > On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 07:31:56PM -0800, Greg KH wrote:
> > > > So, once that proof is written, suddenly all of the working Linux
> > > > distros's keys will be revoked?  That will be fun to watch happen, and
> > > > odds are, it will not.  Imagine the PR fun that will cause :)
> > > 
> > > No. Why would they be?
> > 
> > Because they are using the "public" shim that you provided them, or the
> > Linux Foundation's shim.  Almost no distro, other than the "main" 3-4
> > will end up getting their own shim signed, the rest will just use the
> > one you so helpfully provided them :)
> 
> There's no reason for the LF or generic shim to be blacklisted, since 
> neither will load anything without manual intervention. But that also 
> means that anyone trying to boot them has to have some knowledge of 
> English, and that there's no way to netboot them. But sure, anyone 
> planning that approach has much less to worry about.

I don't see anything about "manual intervention" in the wording that you
provided from Microsoft absolving you from the "duty" you feel you owe
them.  I understand you are worried about "automated" exploits, but that
really is just a semantic overall, as we know it is easy to get people
to hit a key when booting just to get on with the process.

> > Yes you can.  There are all sorts of fun ways you can do this, I can
> > think of a few more at the moment as well.  So, where does it stop?
> > And why stop it at all?  Why not just forbid root users at all?
> 
> Because there's a distinction between ring 0 and ring 3?

Since when did you start trusting ring 0 code?  Bozos like me write this
stuff, surely it isn't secure :)

> > > Microsoft aren't dictating anything here. We're free not to use their 
> > > signatures. However, if we do use their signatures, we agree to play by 
> > > their rules. Nobody seems to have come up with a viable alternative, so 
> > > here we are.
> > 
> > Ok, I keep hearing people say, "why doesn't someone else create a
> > signing authority!" all the time.  And it comes down to one big thing,
> > money.
> 
> Right. We've failed at creating an alternative. That doesn't mean that 
> we get to skip the responsibilities associated with the choice we've 
> made.

Wait, who is "we" here?  The community?  The community over-all didn't
agree with anything with Microsoft, that is between the people getting a
signed key and Microsoft.  Again, you are trying to push your (prior)
company's agreement between them and Microsoft onto the community, and
now the community is pushing back, is that a surprise?

thanks,

greg k-h
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