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Message-ID: <20130227152429.GA5609@thunk.org>
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2013 10:24:29 -0500
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
To: Peter Jones <pjones@...hat.com>
Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@...il.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fw@...eb.enyo.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>,
Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, keyrings@...ux-nfs.org,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Load keys from signed PE binaries
On Tue, Feb 26, 2013 at 11:54:51AM -0500, Peter Jones wrote:
> No, no, no. Quit saying nobody knows. We've got a pretty good idea -
> we've got a contract with them, and it says they provide the signing
> service, and under circumstances where the thing being signed is found
> to enable malware that circumvents Secure Boot
The question is what does "malware that circuments Secure Boot" mean?
Does starting up a hacked KVM and running Windows 8 under KVM so that
malare can be injected count as circumenting Secure Boot? If so, will
you have to disable KVM, too?
What if someone implements a virtualization bootkit for Windows 8.
Will they revoke their own key? Somehow, I doubt that....
- Ted
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