linux-kernel - Re: [GIT PULL] Load keys from signed PE binaries

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Message-ID: <512E4409.2040907@genband.com>
Date:	Wed, 27 Feb 2013 11:36:09 -0600
From:	Chris Friesen <chris.friesen@...band.com>
To:	Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>, Peter Jones <pjones@...hat.com>,
	Dave Airlie <airlied@...il.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fw@...eb.enyo.de>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>,
	Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, keyrings@...ux-nfs.org,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Load keys from signed PE binaries

On 02/27/2013 09:24 AM, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 26, 2013 at 11:54:51AM -0500, Peter Jones wrote:
>> No, no, no.  Quit saying nobody knows.  We've got a pretty good idea -
>> we've got a contract with them, and it says they provide the signing
>> service, and under circumstances where the thing being signed is found
>> to enable malware that circumvents Secure Boot
>
> The question is what does "malware that circuments Secure Boot" mean?
> Does starting up a hacked KVM and running Windows 8 under KVM so that
> malare can be injected count as circumenting Secure Boot?  If so, will
> you have to disable KVM, too?

I could see an argument for KVM to require either a signed binary or 
else someone at the keyboard to explicitly okay loading the image. 
Anything else breaks the chain of trust.

It may be somewhat far-fetched, but I think it would be possible to take 
an existing secure-boot Win 8 install, turn it into a VM but with an 
infected kernel. Then install a signed Linux distro that runs the Win8 
VM as a guest.

At this point you've got a running infected Win8 install that is running 
on Secure Boot hardware but is actually running malware.

Admittedly this would be tricky to do reliably in a way that the user 
doesn't notice, so it may not actually be a real-world threat.

Chris
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