Date:	Wed, 27 Feb 2013 14:45:06 -0500
From:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:	Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
Cc:	"Kasatkin, Dmitry" <dmitry.kasatkin@...el.com>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ima: prevent dead lock when a file is opened for direct
 io

On Wed, 2013-02-27 at 19:00 +0000, Al Viro wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 27, 2013 at 11:21:15AM +0200, Kasatkin, Dmitry wrote:
> > On Wed, Feb 27, 2013 at 1:22 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > > On Tue, 2013-02-26 at 20:34 +0000, Al Viro wrote:
> > >> On Tue, Feb 26, 2013 at 02:32:08PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > >> > Before anything gets access to the file, the file needs to be measured,
> > >> > appraised, and/or audited, based on policy.  If IMA-appraisal is enabled
> > >> > and the file is in policy, we enforce local file integrity and return
> > >> > -EINVAL on failure, similar to LSMs.
> > >> >
> > >> > Appraising the file is a two step process.  Before appraising the file
> > >> > data's integrity, we verify the integrity of the file metadata. Included
> > >> > in the 'security.evm' calculation is the ino, generation, uid, gid,
> > >> > mode, uuid, and the security xattrs.  'security.ima' contains the file
> > >> > data hash or a signature based on the hash.
> > >> >
> > >> > The i_mutex is held when making file metadata changes (eg. xattrs,
> > >> > chmod, ...).  We hold the i_mutex through the entire verification,
> > >> > preventing the file data/metadata from changing.
> > >>
> > >> ->i_mutex is *not* guaranteed to prevent file data changes.  It does
> > >> cover metadata, but that's it.  ->write() is not required to take it.
> > >> Note, BTW, that as soon as you've dropped ->i_mutex, the metadata can
> > >> be changed by somebody else.
> > >
> > > Any time file metadata included in the HMAC is updated, 'security.evm'
> > > is updated to reflect the change.  But before 'security.evm' is updated,
> > > evm_verify_current_integrity() verifies the existing value.
> > >
> > >> What do you achieve by holding it over the vfs_read() call?
> > >
> > > - Before calculating the file hash, verifying it against the digest in
> > > 'security.ima' and storing the verification status in the iint, we check
> > > the iint to see whether it was previously verified.  By taking the
> > > i_mutex and keeping it, we prevent the file from being hashed multiple
> > > times.
> > >
> > > - Prior to IMA-appraisal, on file close only the iint was updated,
> > > reflecting the fact that the file would need to be re-measured and added
> > > to the measurement list the next time it was opened.  With
> > > IMA-appraisal, on file close, not only do we need to reflect this change
> > > in the iint, but we also need to update the 'security.ima' xattr to
> > > reflect the new hash value.  Having the iint specific lock caused a
> > > lockdep.  In one case, we took the i_mutex followed by the iint lock,
> > > while in the other case, the iint lock was taken before the i_mutex.
> > >
> > >> > I guess I wasn't clear here.  IMA always takes the i_mutex, regardless
> > >> > of the O_DIRECT flag.  When a file is opened for read,
> > >> > process_measurement() takes the i_mutex and then, if the file was opened
> > >> > with the O_DIRECT flag, do_blockdev_direct_IO() attempts to take the
> > >> > i_mutex again, causing the lockdep.
> > >>
> > >> *sigh*
> > >> Do you actually disagree with my description of the locking rules you
> > >> implicitly rely upon?
> > >
> > > Obsolutely not!  I misunderstood what you were saying.  The word
> > > 'unless' was confusing.
> > >
> > >>  Suppose wankfs_file_read() happens to grab
> > >> ->i_mutex for some reason; without IMA it used to be perfectly legitimate.
> > >> With IMA it will deadlock as soon as IMA decides that such file is worth
> > >> its attention.  So these days the rule has (silently) become
> > >>       * ->read() on a regular file is not allowed to touch ->i_mutex
> > >> and with your proposed change it becomes (still undocumented)
> > >>       * ->read() on a regular file is not allowed to touch ->i_mutex unless
> > >> O_DIRECT is present in file flags at the moment of ->read()
> > >> Correct?
> > >
> > > yes, unfortunately.  What would you suggest?
> > >
> > 
> > The main purpose of taking i_mutex is to ensure that measured content
> > of the file (vfs_read) is in sync with extended attribute values.
> > 
> > If in overall taking a i_mutex before calling vsf_read is
> > fundamentally wrong, then one of the solutions is to introduce back
> > the usage of IMA specific mutex.
> > iint->mutex was removed because it caused dead locking due different
> > locking order in different cases.
> 
> BTW, speaking of races in there: what's to stop ima_file_mmap() from
> racing with rename()?  You have
> int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
> {
>         if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC))
>                 return process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
>                                            MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
>         return 0;
> }
> in there; just what is that ->d_name.name good for?  By the time you get
> through calculating hash (which, by definition, may include a considerable
> amount of IO), the pointer you have passed might be pointing to anything.
> 
> If the name is short, it's kept within dentry and updated by d_move() (not
> that I'd seen any exclusion with that in there, while we are at it).  If
> the name is too long to fit into struct dentry, it's allocated separately.
> See fs/dcache.c:switch_names() for what's being ultimately done on rename();
> dname_external() is a predicate telling if we store the name separately.
> The normal sequence of events if you rename(something/very_long_file_name,
> something_else) is this:
> 	* we get dentries of both source and target; dentry of source has
> ->d_name pointing to separately allocated name
> 	* filesystem is asked to move the sucker; suppose it succeeds
> 	* we do d_move(source, target)
> 		* target is unhashed
> 		* source and target names and pointers to parents are
> 		  exchanged - now source is where we wanted it to be placed
> 		  and its old ->d_name is not lost - target->d_name points
> 		  to it now.  Not for long, though, since...
> 	* ... we drop references to source and target we had acquired.  And
> 	  since target had been unhashed, down the drain it goes.  Which
> 	  frees its separately allocated ->d_name (i.e. what used to be
> 	  old name of source) and drops the reference to its parent (i.e.
> 	  what used to be the old parent of source).
> Now think what happens if you have found source->d_name.name before rename(2)
> and dereferenced it after.
> 
> The real question is, what are you using that name for?  Or ima_d_path()
> result that normally gets used instead of it, for that matter.  Sure,
> in case of ima_d_path() you will have a safe copy of what used to be
> the pathname.  What is it good for, though, when the file might've been
> moved just as ima_d_path() returns its copy of pathname to caller?

The name helps userspace correlate a file hash with a specific file:

- cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements

The measurement list is being used for attestation.

LSS 2012: The Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture and
TPM-Based Network Endpoint Assessment - Andreas Steffen
http://kernsec.org/files/LSS_2012_strongSwan_IMA.pdf

- "audit log hashes" is being used, I assume, for big data analytics
- auditing integrity errors

thanks,

Mimi

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