linux-kernel - Re: [GIT PULL] Load keys from signed PE binaries

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Date:	Thu, 28 Feb 2013 23:05:19 +0000
From:	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
To:	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
Cc:	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	jwboyer@...hat.com, pjones@...hat.com, vgoyal@...hat.com,
	keescook@...omium.org, keyrings@...ux-nfs.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	Florian Weimer <fw@...eb.enyo.de>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Load keys from signed PE binaries

On Fri, Mar 01, 2013 at 12:02:43AM +0100, Jiri Kosina wrote:

> But the real harm is being done by the i_own_your_ring0.ko module, which 
> can be modprobed on all the systems where the signed "hello world" binary 
> has been keyctl-ed before it was blacklisted.

Sure, if you've been infected before the revocation, you'll still be 
infected. There's not really any good way around that.

> In other words -- you blacklist the population of the key on systems by 
> blakclisting the key-carrying binary, but the key remains trusted on 
> whatever system the binary has been processed by keyctl before. Right?

You have to re-load it on every boot, it's not a permanent thing.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@...f.ucam.org
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