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Message-ID: <20130228234743.GA13709@srcf.ucam.org>
Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2013 23:47:43 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
To: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
jwboyer@...hat.com, pjones@...hat.com, vgoyal@...hat.com,
keescook@...omium.org, keyrings@...ux-nfs.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Florian Weimer <fw@...eb.enyo.de>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Load keys from signed PE binaries
On Fri, Mar 01, 2013 at 12:45:23AM +0100, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Thu, 28 Feb 2013, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > Sure, if you've been infected before the revocation, you'll still be
> > infected. There's not really any good way around that.
>
> Which is a very substantial difference to normal X509 chain of trust,
> isn't it?
If you've loaded an x.509 certificate into the kernel and it's later
revoked, any module signed with the key is going to be loadable until
it's revoked. I don't see an especially large difference here?
--
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@...f.ucam.org
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