linux-kernel - Re: IMA: How to manage user space signing policy with others

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Message-ID: <1362102307.9158.32.camel@falcor1>
Date:	Thu, 28 Feb 2013 20:45:07 -0500
From:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:	Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>
Cc:	linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: IMA: How to manage user space signing policy with others

On Thu, 2013-02-28 at 15:08 -0500, Vivek Goyal wrote:

> - New hook is required so that we can call it after locking down the
>   executable in memory. Even if we have a separate method/hook for
>   bzImage verification, it does not take away the need for verifying
>   /sbin/kexec excutable signature. Because apart from bzImage, that
>   process loads lot more information like purgatory, bootparams and
>   there is no way to verify signatures of those. So by verifying
>   /sbin/kexec it is assumed that purgaotry and bootparams can be
>   trusted because it is coming from a signed process.

Ok, this is what I was missing.

thanks,

Mimi

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