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Message-ID: <1363798166.2553.29.camel@x230.sbx07502.somerma.wayport.net>
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2013 16:49:26 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
CC: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
"kexec@...ts.infradead.org" <kexec@...ts.infradead.org>,
"linux-pci@...r.kernel.org" <linux-pci@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/12] Security: Add CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL
On Wed, 2013-03-20 at 12:41 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Matthrew, perhaps you could clarify whether this will be tied to MAC
> security. Based on the kexec thread, I'm under the impression that is
> not the intention, or at least not for kexec. As root isn't trusted,
> neither is the boot command line, nor any policy that is loaded by root,
> including those for MAC.
The work done on signed initramfs fragments would seem to be the best
option here so far?
--
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@...f.ucam.org
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