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Message-ID: <1363749503.24132.482.camel@bling.home>
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2013 21:18:23 -0600
From: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
"kexec@...ts.infradead.org" <kexec@...ts.infradead.org>,
"linux-pci@...r.kernel.org" <linux-pci@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/12] Security: Add CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL
On Tue, 2013-03-19 at 20:08 -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 03/19/2013 07:48 PM, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> > On 03/19/2013 06:28 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> >> Mm. The question is whether we can reliably determine the ranges a
> device should be able to access without having to trust userspace
> (and, ideally, without having to worry about whether iommu vendors
> have done their job). It's pretty important for PCI passthrough, so we
> do need to care.
> >
> > It is actually very simple: the device should be able to DMA into/out of:
> >
> > 1. pinned pages
> > 2. owned by the process controlling the device
> >
> > ... and nothing else.
> >
>
> The "pinning" process needs to involve a call to the kernel to process
> the page for DMA (pinning the page and opening it in the iommu) and
> return a transaction address, of course.
>
> I think we have the interface for that in vfio, but I haven't followed
> that work.
Yes, vfio does this and is meant to provide a secure-boot-friendly PCI
passthrough interface. Thanks,
Alex
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