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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLs1ghuCwcu7crOG1OHuiaP3hmzYY410br_puc9i82-2g@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2013 09:33:08 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Christian Kujau <lists@...dbynature.de>,
"# 3.4.x" <stable@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] kmsg: Honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on /dev/kmsg
On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 8:48 AM, Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com> wrote:
> The dmesg_restrict sysctl currently covers the syslog method for access
> dmesg, however /dev/kmsg isn't covered by the same protections. Most
> people haven't noticed because util-linux dmesg(1) defaults to using the
> syslog method for access in older versions. With util-linux dmesg(1)
> defaults to reading directly from /dev/kmsg.
>
> Fix this by reworking all of the access methods to use the
> check_syslog_permissions function and adding checks to devkmsg_open and
> devkmsg_read.
>
> This fixes https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=903192
>
> Reported-by: Christian Kujau <lists@...dbynature.de>
> CC: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>
Thanks!
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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