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Message-ID: <20130409201558.GE31242@madcap2.tricolour.ca>
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2013 16:15:58 -0400
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-audit@...hat.com,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] [BZ905179] audit: omit check for uid and gid validity in
audit rules and data
On Tue, Apr 09, 2013 at 02:39:32AM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org> writes:
> > On Wed, 20 Mar 2013 15:18:17 -0400 Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com> wrote:
> >> audit rule additions containing "-F auid!=4294967295" were failing with EINVAL.
> >>
> >> UID_INVALID (and GID_INVALID) is actually a valid uid (gid) for setting and
> >> testing against audit rules. Remove the check for invalid uid and gid when
> >> parsing rules and data for logging.
>
> In general testing against invalid uid appears completely bogus, and
> should always return true. As it is and essentially always has been
> incorrect to explicitly set any kernel uid to that value.
My understanding is that any process started by init has UID -1
(UID_INVALID). I was a little uncomfortable with this fact when I
learned it, but understand that it is probably too late to change that
now to a reserved value in-band (some probably use -2 or 4294967294 for
nobody).
This leaves an out-of-band solution as has been partially suggested below...
> The only case where this appears to make the least little bit of sense
> is if the goal of the test is to test to see if an audit logloginuid
> has been set at all. In which case depending on a test against
> 4294967295 is bogus because you are depending on an intimate internal
> kernel implementation detail.
I agree this is ugly.
> Certainly removing the gid_valid tests is completely gratitious in this
> case.
I think I understand that now.
> >> Revert part of ca57ec0f00c3f139c41bf6b0a5b9bcc95bbb2ad7 (2012-09-11) to fix
> >> this.
> >
> > Eric, can you please take a look?
> >
> >> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
> >> ---
> >> kernel/auditfilter.c | 12 ------------
> >> 1 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> >> index f9fc54b..457ee39 100644
> >> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> >> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> >> @@ -360,10 +360,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct audit_rule *rule)
> >> /* bit ops not implemented for uid comparisons */
> >> if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
> >> goto exit_free;
> >> -
> >> f->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), f->val);
> >> - if (!uid_valid(f->uid))
> >> - goto exit_free;
> >
> > It concerns me that map_id_down() can return -1 on error and that this
> > change causes the kernel to no longer notice that error?
>
> Me too. Where we only communicate with audit in the initial user
> namespace right now it isn't absolutely broken but it certainly isn't a
> habit I want to get into.
It will be soon if we try to get auditd in containers talking to the
host kernel, so I agree this needs a better approach.
> How about something like my untested patch below that add an explicit
> operation to test if loginuid has been set?
>
> Eric
>
> From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
> Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2013 02:22:10 -0700
> Subject: [PATCH] audit: Make testing for a valid loginuid explicit.
>
> audit rule additions containing "-F auid!=4294967295" were failing
> with EINVAL.
>
> Apparently some userland audit rule sets want to know if loginuid uid
> has been set and are using a test for auid != 4294967295 to determine
> that.
>
> In practice that is a horrible way to ask if a value has been set,
> because it relies on subtle implementation details and will break
> every time the uid implementation in the kernel changes.
>
> So add a clean way to test if the audit loginuid has been set, and
> silently convert the old idiom to the cleaner and more comprehensible
> new idiom.
>
> Reported-By: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com> wrote:
The reporting credit goes to Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>. I just
attempted a fix.
> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
> ---
> include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++++
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> kernel/auditfilter.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> kernel/auditsc.c | 5 ++++-
> 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index a9fefe2..8a1ddde 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -390,6 +390,11 @@ static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
> #define audit_signals 0
> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
>
> +static inline bool audit_loginuid_set(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> + return uid_valid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk));
> +}
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
> /* These are defined in audit.c */
> /* Public API */
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index 9f096f1..9554a19 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -246,6 +246,7 @@
> #define AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE 21
> #define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW 22
> #define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH 23
> +#define AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET 24
>
> /* These are ONLY useful when checking
> * at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index 540f986..6381d17 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -349,6 +349,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct audit_rule *rule)
> if (f->op == Audit_bad)
> goto exit_free;
>
> + /* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */
> + if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == 4294967295)) {
> + f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET;
> + f->val = 0;
> + }
> +
> switch(f->type) {
> default:
> goto exit_free;
> @@ -377,6 +383,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct audit_rule *rule)
> if (!gid_valid(f->gid))
> goto exit_free;
> break;
> + case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
> + if ((f->op != Audit_not_equal) && (f->op != Audit_equal))
> + goto exit_free;
> + if ((f->val != 0) && (f->val != 1))
Why the extra comparison to "1"?
Are you anticipating already a userspace process making a call using the
newof type AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET with a value of 1?
> + goto exit_free;
> + break;
> case AUDIT_PID:
> case AUDIT_PERS:
> case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
> @@ -459,6 +471,13 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
> f->gid = INVALID_GID;
> f->lsm_str = NULL;
> f->lsm_rule = NULL;
> +
> + /* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */
> + if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == 4294967295)) {
> + f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET;
> + f->val = 0;
> + }
> +
> switch(f->type) {
> case AUDIT_UID:
> case AUDIT_EUID:
> @@ -487,6 +506,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
> if (!gid_valid(f->gid))
> goto exit_free;
> break;
> + case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
> + if ((f->op != Audit_not_equal) && (f->op != Audit_equal))
> + goto exit_free;
> + if ((f->val != 0) && (f->val != 1))
(Again...)
> + goto exit_free;
> + break;
> case AUDIT_PID:
> case AUDIT_PERS:
> case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
> @@ -1380,6 +1405,10 @@ static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct audit_krule *rule,
> result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(current),
> f->op, f->uid);
> break;
> + case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
> + result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(current),
> + f->op, f->val);
> + break;
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 3a11d34..27d0a50 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -750,6 +750,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> if (ctx)
> result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->uid);
> break;
> + case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
> + result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
> + break;
(OT: I assume the "if (ctx)" is wrong in the AUDIT_LOGINUID case above.)
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> @@ -2317,7 +2320,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
> unsigned int sessionid;
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE
> - if (uid_valid(task->loginuid))
> + if (audit_loginuid_set(task))
> return -EPERM;
> #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */
> if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
> --
> 1.7.5.4
>
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <rbriggs@...hat.com>
Senior Software Engineer
AMER ENG Base Operating Systems
Remote, Canada, Ottawa
Voice: 1.647.777.2635
Internal: (81) 32635
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