linux-kernel - Re: [RFC 2/2] initramfs with digital signature protection

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Date:	Thu, 11 Apr 2013 10:55:50 -0400
From:	Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>
To:	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>
Cc:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...il.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC 2/2] initramfs with digital signature protection

On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 11:06:55AM +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> I respond to the original question of this thread.
> signed initramfs allows not only to add keys to the keyrings but perform
> other initialization,
> which requires user-space.
> Keys can be embedded into the kernel. This is fine.

What other initialization user space need to do where we can't trust
root (even in secureboot mode).

IOW, if keys can be embedded in kernel (or read from UEFI db and MOK db),
what other operation requires initramfs to be signed. It could very well
be unsigned initramfs like today.

Thanks
Vivek
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