3.6.11.2 stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Kees Cook [ Upstream commit 3118a4f652c7b12c752f3222af0447008f9b2368 ] It is possible to wrap the counter used to allocate the buffer for relocation copies. This could lead to heap writing overflows. CVE-2013-0913 v3: collapse test, improve comment v2: move check into validate_exec_list Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Reported-by: Pinkie Pie Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt --- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c index cdf46b5..c26a8f8 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c @@ -910,15 +910,20 @@ validate_exec_list(struct drm_i915_gem_exec_object2 *exec, int count) { int i; + int relocs_total = 0; + int relocs_max = INT_MAX / sizeof(struct drm_i915_gem_relocation_entry); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { char __user *ptr = (char __user *)(uintptr_t)exec[i].relocs_ptr; int length; /* limited by fault_in_pages_readable() */ - /* First check for malicious input causing overflow */ - if (exec[i].relocation_count > - INT_MAX / sizeof(struct drm_i915_gem_relocation_entry)) + /* First check for malicious input causing overflow in + * the worst case where we need to allocate the entire + * relocation tree as a single array. + */ + if (exec[i].relocation_count > relocs_max - relocs_total) return -EINVAL; + relocs_total += exec[i].relocation_count; length = exec[i].relocation_count * sizeof(struct drm_i915_gem_relocation_entry); -- 1.7.10.4 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/