linux-kernel - Re: Early microcode signing in secure boot environment - Was: x86, microcode: Use common get_ramdisk

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Message-ID: <51673E8C.9080806@zytor.com>
Date:	Thu, 11 Apr 2013 15:51:56 -0700
From:	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To:	Thomas Renninger <trenn@...e.de>
CC:	"Yu, Fenghua" <fenghua.yu@...el.com>,
	Tang Chen <tangchen@...fujitsu.com>,
	Yinghai Lu <yinghai@...nel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Early microcode signing in secure boot environment -  Was: x86,
 microcode: Use common get_ramdisk_image()

On 04/11/2013 01:59 AM, Thomas Renninger wrote:
> 
>>> Is this "cryptographically authenticated by the CPU itself" thing
>>> documented
>>> somewhere so that security people can double check that it is really
>>> secure?
>>
>> X86 SDM defines that the second part of microcode update is the encrypted
>> data.
> 
> Again, I doubt it is allowed to bypass UEFI authentication with arbitrary, 
> vendor specific authentication checks.
> 

What does that even mean in this context?

	-hpa


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