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Message-Id: <20130423215208.947820089@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2013 14:52:32 -0700
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Subject: [ 34/42] userns: Changing any namespace id mappings should require privileges
3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
commit 41c21e351e79004dbb4efa4bc14a53a7e0af38c5 upstream.
Changing uid/gid/projid mappings doesn't change your id within the
namespace; it reconfigures the namespace. Unprivileged programs should
*not* be able to write these files. (We're also checking the privileges
on the wrong task.)
Given the write-once nature of these files and the other security
checks, this is likely impossible to usefully exploit.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/user_namespace.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -576,10 +576,10 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *fi
if (map->nr_extents != 0)
goto out;
- /* Require the appropriate privilege CAP_SETUID or CAP_SETGID
- * over the user namespace in order to set the id mapping.
+ /*
+ * Adjusting namespace settings requires capabilities on the target.
*/
- if (cap_valid(cap_setid) && !ns_capable(ns, cap_setid))
+ if (cap_valid(cap_setid) && !file_ns_capable(file, ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
goto out;
/* Get a buffer */
--
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