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Message-ID: <517863F8.7050606@canonical.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2013 16:00:08 -0700
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
CC: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
LKLM <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
SE Linux <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 0/9] LSM: Multiple concurrent LSMs
On 04/24/2013 02:15 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 01:22:20 PM Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 4/24/2013 11:57 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> I know we had a good discussion about this a while back and I just wanted
>>> to hear from you about this current patchset; how does the labeled
>>> networking LSM assignment work? Is it first-come-first-served based on
>>> the 'security=' setting?
>>
>> It's explicitly set in security/Kconfig. The problem with
>> first-come-first-serve is that the LSMs don't actually register
>> in the order specified, either at build time or boot time.
>> Further, until the init phase is complete, you don't know which
>> LSMs are actually going to register. That, and I promised Tetsuo
>> I wouldn't go out of my way to prevent late module loading in
>> the future.
>>
>> I could do order checking on module registration and take
>> the networking component away from an LSM that registered
>> earlier, but with a larger order number I suppose.
>
> Hmmm. How difficult would it be to enforce the order during LSM registration?
> As discussed previously, I'm not a big fan of assigning the network controls
> at compile time when the LSMs can be toggled at boot time.
>
> The real solution is to just get the netdev folks to accept a security blob in
> the sk_buff so we can fix this (and many other problems) once and for all. I
> still haven't given up on this effort but I think it would be silly to hold up
> the stacking effort for the sk_buff security blob.
>
>> The default configuration gives xfrm and secmark to SELinux
>> and NetLabel to Smack. If Smack is not included NetLabel goes
>> to SELinux. When LSMs using any of these facilities are added
>> in the future we'll have to negotiate the defaults.
>
> The defaults are always going to be wrong for someone.
>
>> An interesting aside that may be relevant is that the error
>> condition behavior makes it advisable to have the LSM you care
>> about most go last. If the networking components were strictly
>> FCFS you might have to chose an ordering you might not want for
>> other reasons.
>
> Well, maybe not ... I think. If we take a FCFS approach to the network
> controls then only one LSM is really ever going to throw an error on the
> network hooks, yes?
>
>> It would be possible to have a boot time specification for
>> the networking components if you think it's important. I do
>> worry about making it excessively complicated. I'd be much more
>> concerned if more LSMs used the networking components.
>
> I think the "excessively complicated" boat has already sailed :)
>
> I'm still in favor of assigning the network hooks to the LSM at boot based on
> the "security=" configuration.
>
yeah dealing with selection at boot time is going to be needed
at some point, whether its now or later ...
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