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Message-Id: <1367102679-5178-3-git-send-email-hpa@zytor.com>
Date: Sat, 27 Apr 2013 15:44:38 -0700
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To: "Ted Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
DJ Johnston <dj.johnston@...el.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...ux.intel.com>, <stable@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] random: Allow fractional bits to be tracked
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Allow fractional bits of entropy to be tracked by scaling the entropy
counter (fixed point). This will be used in a subsequent patch that
accounts for entropy lost due to overwrites.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@...r.kernel.org>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 68 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 106b9b2..5cc8e86 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -280,6 +280,14 @@
#define LONGS(x) (((x) + sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)/sizeof(unsigned long))
/*
+ * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the following fields contain
+ * this many fractional bits:
+ *
+ * entropy_count, trickle_thresh
+ */
+#define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3
+
+/*
* The minimum number of bits of entropy before we wake up a read on
* /dev/random. Should be enough to do a significant reseed.
*/
@@ -296,8 +304,7 @@ static int random_write_wakeup_thresh = 128;
* When the input pool goes over trickle_thresh, start dropping most
* samples to avoid wasting CPU time and reduce lock contention.
*/
-
-static int trickle_thresh __read_mostly = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 28;
+static const int trickle_thresh = (INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 28) << ENTROPY_SHIFT;
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, trickle_count);
@@ -311,8 +318,8 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, trickle_count);
*/
static struct poolinfo {
- int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolbits;
-#define S(x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x)*32
+ int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolbits, poolfracbits;
+#define S(x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x)*32, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5)
int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
} poolinfo_table[] = {
/* x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 -- 105 */
@@ -581,7 +588,9 @@ static void fast_mix(struct fast_pool *f, const void *in, int nbytes)
}
/*
- * Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy
+ * Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy.
+ * Use credit_entropy_bits_safe() if the value comes from userspace
+ * or otherwise should be checked for extreme values.
*/
static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
{
@@ -593,13 +602,13 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
DEBUG_ENT("added %d entropy credits to %s\n", nbits, r->name);
retry:
entropy_count = orig = ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
- entropy_count += nbits;
+ entropy_count += nbits << ENTROPY_SHIFT;
if (entropy_count < 0) {
DEBUG_ENT("negative entropy/overflow\n");
entropy_count = 0;
- } else if (entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolbits)
- entropy_count = r->poolinfo->poolbits;
+ } else if (entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits)
+ entropy_count = r->poolinfo->poolfracbits;
if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
goto retry;
@@ -613,12 +622,24 @@ retry:
r->entropy_total, _RET_IP_);
/* should we wake readers? */
- if (r == &input_pool && entropy_count >= random_read_wakeup_thresh) {
+ if (r == &input_pool &&
+ (entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) >= random_read_wakeup_thresh) {
wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait);
kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
}
}
+static void credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
+{
+ const int nbits_max = (int)(~0U >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 1));
+
+ /* Cap the value to avoid overflows */
+ nbits = min(nbits, nbits_max);
+ nbits = max(nbits, -nbits_max);
+
+ credit_entropy_bits(r, nbits);
+}
+
/*********************************************************************
*
* Entropy input management
@@ -813,8 +834,9 @@ static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
{
__u32 tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
- if (r->pull && r->entropy_count < nbytes * 8 &&
- r->entropy_count < r->poolinfo->poolbits) {
+ if (r->pull &&
+ r->entropy_count < (nbytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)) &&
+ r->entropy_count < r->poolinfo->poolfracbits) {
/* If we're limited, always leave two wakeup worth's BITS */
int rsvd = r->limit ? 0 : random_read_wakeup_thresh/4;
int bytes = nbytes;
@@ -826,7 +848,8 @@ static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
DEBUG_ENT("going to reseed %s with %d bits "
"(%zu of %d requested)\n",
- r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8, r->entropy_count);
+ r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8,
+ r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT);
bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes,
random_read_wakeup_thresh / 8, rsvd);
@@ -852,28 +875,31 @@ static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min,
{
unsigned long flags;
int wakeup_write = 0;
+ int have_bytes;
/* Hold lock while accounting */
spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
- BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolbits);
+ BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits);
DEBUG_ENT("trying to extract %zu bits from %s\n",
nbytes * 8, r->name);
/* Can we pull enough? */
- if (r->entropy_count / 8 < min + reserved) {
+ have_bytes = r->entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
+ if (have_bytes < min + reserved) {
nbytes = 0;
} else {
/* If limited, never pull more than available */
- if (r->limit && nbytes + reserved >= r->entropy_count / 8)
- nbytes = r->entropy_count/8 - reserved;
+ if (r->limit && nbytes + reserved >= have_bytes)
+ nbytes = have_bytes - reserved;
- if (r->entropy_count / 8 >= nbytes + reserved)
- r->entropy_count -= nbytes*8;
+ if (have_bytes >= nbytes + reserved)
+ r->entropy_count -= nbytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
else
- r->entropy_count = reserved;
+ r->entropy_count = reserved << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
- if (r->entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_thresh)
+ if ((r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT)
+ < random_write_wakeup_thresh)
wakeup_write = 1;
}
@@ -1269,7 +1295,8 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
switch (cmd) {
case RNDGETENTCNT:
/* inherently racy, no point locking */
- if (put_user(input_pool.entropy_count, p))
+ ent_count = input_pool.entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
+ if (put_user(ent_count, p))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case RNDADDTOENTCNT:
@@ -1277,7 +1304,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
return -EPERM;
if (get_user(ent_count, p))
return -EFAULT;
- credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, ent_count);
+ credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
return 0;
case RNDADDENTROPY:
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
@@ -1292,7 +1319,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
size);
if (retval < 0)
return retval;
- credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, ent_count);
+ credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
return 0;
case RNDZAPENTCNT:
case RNDCLEARPOOL:
@@ -1399,6 +1426,23 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(ctl_table *table, int write,
return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
}
+/*
+ * Return entropy available scaled to integral bits
+ */
+static int proc_do_entropy(ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ ctl_table fake_table;
+ int entropy_count;
+
+ entropy_count = *(int *)table->data >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
+
+ fake_table.data = &entropy_count;
+ fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(entropy_count);
+
+ return proc_dointvec(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+}
+
static int sysctl_poolsize = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
extern ctl_table random_table[];
ctl_table random_table[] = {
@@ -1413,7 +1457,7 @@ ctl_table random_table[] = {
.procname = "entropy_avail",
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0444,
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
+ .proc_handler = proc_do_entropy,
.data = &input_pool.entropy_count,
},
{
--
1.7.11.7
--
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