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Message-ID: <20130430180931.GA17145@www.outflux.net>
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2013 11:09:31 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>
Subject: [RESEND][PATCH] audit: fix event coverage of AUDIT_ANOM_LINK
The userspace audit tools didn't like the existing formatting of the
AUDIT_ANOM_LINK event. It needed to be expanded to emit an AUDIT_PATH
event as well, so this implements the change. The bulk of the patch is
moving code out of auditsc.c into audit.c and audit.h for general use.
It expands audit_log_name to include an optional "struct path" argument
for the simple case of just needing to report a pathname. This also makes
audit_log_task_info available when syscall auditing is not enabled, since
it is needed in either case for process details.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Reported-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>
---
v2:
- make task_info report non-optional (otherwise userspace can't correlate)
---
include/linux/audit.h | 16 ++-
kernel/audit.c | 244 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
kernel/audit.h | 159 ++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/auditsc.c | 353 +------------------------------------------------
4 files changed, 405 insertions(+), 367 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 5a6d718..b97809da 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -185,8 +185,6 @@ static inline int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk)
return tsk->sessionid;
}
-extern void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab);
-extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk);
extern void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);
extern void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode);
extern int __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
@@ -340,11 +338,6 @@ static inline int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
return -1;
}
-static inline void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
-{ }
-static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab,
- struct task_struct *tsk)
-{ }
static inline void audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{ }
static inline void audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid,
@@ -429,6 +422,10 @@ static inline void audit_log_secctx(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 secid)
{ }
#endif
+extern void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab);
+extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct task_struct *tsk);
+
extern int audit_update_lsm_rules(void);
/* Private API (for audit.c only) */
@@ -476,6 +473,11 @@ static inline void audit_log_link_denied(const char *string,
{ }
static inline void audit_log_secctx(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 secid)
{ }
+static inline void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+{ }
+static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct task_struct *tsk)
+{ }
#define audit_enabled 0
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
static inline void audit_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 9816a1b..b50660b 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/kthread.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
@@ -1443,6 +1444,224 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
}
+void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
+ CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%08x",
+ cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
+ }
+}
+
+void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
+{
+ kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
+ kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
+ int log = 0;
+
+ if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
+ audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
+ log = 1;
+ }
+ if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
+ audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
+ log = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (log)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x",
+ name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
+}
+
+static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
+ const struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!dentry)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
+ name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
+ name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
+ name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >>
+ VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
+void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
+ const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ name->ino = inode->i_ino;
+ name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+ name->mode = inode->i_mode;
+ name->uid = inode->i_uid;
+ name->gid = inode->i_gid;
+ name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
+ audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names
+ * @context: audit_context for the task
+ * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details
+ * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name
+ * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names
+ * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails
+ */
+void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
+ struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic)
+{
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
+ if (!ab)
+ return;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
+
+ if (path)
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path);
+ else if (n->name) {
+ switch (n->name_len) {
+ case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
+ /* log the full path */
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ /* name was specified as a relative path and the
+ * directory component is the cwd */
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* log the name's directory component */
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+ audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
+ n->name_len);
+ }
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
+
+ if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
+ " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho"
+ " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
+ n->ino,
+ MAJOR(n->dev),
+ MINOR(n->dev),
+ n->mode,
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
+ from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
+ MAJOR(n->rdev),
+ MINOR(n->rdev));
+ }
+ if (n->osid != 0) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(
+ n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
+ if (call_panic)
+ *call_panic = 2;
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
+ }
+
+ audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
+void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+{
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ unsigned len;
+ int error;
+ u32 sid;
+
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
+ if (!sid)
+ return;
+
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ if (error) {
+ if (error != -EINVAL)
+ goto error_path;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ return;
+
+error_path:
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
+ return;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
+
+void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred;
+ char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
+ struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
+ char *tty;
+
+ if (!ab)
+ return;
+
+ /* tsk == current */
+ cred = current_cred();
+
+ spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+ if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
+ tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
+ else
+ tty = "(none)";
+ spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ " ppid=%ld pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
+ " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
+ " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u ses=%u tty=%s",
+ sys_getppid(),
+ tsk->pid,
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(tsk)),
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
+ from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->gid),
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->euid),
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->suid),
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid),
+ from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->egid),
+ from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid),
+ from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid),
+ audit_get_sessionid(tsk), tty);
+
+ get_task_comm(name, tsk);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
+
+ if (mm) {
+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ if (mm->exe_file)
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, " exe=", &mm->exe_file->f_path);
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ }
+ audit_log_task_context(ab);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_info);
+
/**
* audit_log_link_denied - report a link restriction denial
* @operation: specific link opreation
@@ -1451,19 +1670,28 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
void audit_log_link_denied(const char *operation, struct path *link)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ struct audit_names *name;
+
+ name = kzalloc(sizeof(*name), GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!name)
+ return;
+ /* Generate AUDIT_ANOM_LINK with subject, operation, outcome. */
ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
AUDIT_ANOM_LINK);
if (!ab)
- return;
- audit_log_format(ab, "op=%s action=denied", operation);
- audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
- audit_log_d_path(ab, " path=", link);
- audit_log_format(ab, " dev=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, link->dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_id);
- audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", link->dentry->d_inode->i_ino);
+ goto out;
+ audit_log_format(ab, "op=%s", operation);
+ audit_log_task_info(ab, current);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " res=0");
audit_log_end(ab);
+
+ /* Generate AUDIT_PATH record with object. */
+ name->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
+ audit_copy_inode(name, link->dentry, link->dentry->d_inode);
+ audit_log_name(current->audit_context, name, link, 0, NULL);
+out:
+ kfree(name);
}
/**
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 11468d9..45c8325 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h>
/* 0 = no checking
1 = put_count checking
@@ -29,6 +30,11 @@
*/
#define AUDIT_DEBUG 0
+/* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
+ * for saving names from getname(). If we get more names we will allocate
+ * a name dynamically and also add those to the list anchored by names_list. */
+#define AUDIT_NAMES 5
+
/* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
the syscall filter. */
@@ -59,8 +65,161 @@ struct audit_entry {
struct audit_krule rule;
};
+struct audit_cap_data {
+ kernel_cap_t permitted;
+ kernel_cap_t inheritable;
+ union {
+ unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of file cap */
+ kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of process */
+ };
+};
+
+/* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
+ * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
+ * pointers at syscall exit time).
+ *
+ * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device.
+ */
+struct audit_names {
+ struct list_head list; /* audit_context->names_list */
+
+ struct filename *name;
+ int name_len; /* number of chars to log */
+ bool name_put; /* call __putname()? */
+
+ unsigned long ino;
+ dev_t dev;
+ umode_t mode;
+ kuid_t uid;
+ kgid_t gid;
+ dev_t rdev;
+ u32 osid;
+ struct audit_cap_data fcap;
+ unsigned int fcap_ver;
+ unsigned char type; /* record type */
+ /*
+ * This was an allocated audit_names and not from the array of
+ * names allocated in the task audit context. Thus this name
+ * should be freed on syscall exit.
+ */
+ bool should_free;
+};
+
+/* The per-task audit context. */
+struct audit_context {
+ int dummy; /* must be the first element */
+ int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
+ enum audit_state state, current_state;
+ unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
+ int major; /* syscall number */
+ struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
+ unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
+ long return_code;/* syscall return code */
+ u64 prio;
+ int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
+ /*
+ * The names_list is the list of all audit_names collected during this
+ * syscall. The first AUDIT_NAMES entries in the names_list will
+ * actually be from the preallocated_names array for performance
+ * reasons. Except during allocation they should never be referenced
+ * through the preallocated_names array and should only be found/used
+ * by running the names_list.
+ */
+ struct audit_names preallocated_names[AUDIT_NAMES];
+ int name_count; /* total records in names_list */
+ struct list_head names_list; /* struct audit_names->list anchor */
+ char *filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
+ struct path pwd;
+ struct audit_aux_data *aux;
+ struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
+ struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr;
+ size_t sockaddr_len;
+ /* Save things to print about task_struct */
+ pid_t pid, ppid;
+ kuid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
+ kgid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
+ unsigned long personality;
+ int arch;
+
+ pid_t target_pid;
+ kuid_t target_auid;
+ kuid_t target_uid;
+ unsigned int target_sessionid;
+ u32 target_sid;
+ char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
+
+ struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
+ struct list_head killed_trees;
+ int tree_count;
+
+ int type;
+ union {
+ struct {
+ int nargs;
+ long args[6];
+ } socketcall;
+ struct {
+ kuid_t uid;
+ kgid_t gid;
+ umode_t mode;
+ u32 osid;
+ int has_perm;
+ uid_t perm_uid;
+ gid_t perm_gid;
+ umode_t perm_mode;
+ unsigned long qbytes;
+ } ipc;
+ struct {
+ mqd_t mqdes;
+ struct mq_attr mqstat;
+ } mq_getsetattr;
+ struct {
+ mqd_t mqdes;
+ int sigev_signo;
+ } mq_notify;
+ struct {
+ mqd_t mqdes;
+ size_t msg_len;
+ unsigned int msg_prio;
+ struct timespec abs_timeout;
+ } mq_sendrecv;
+ struct {
+ int oflag;
+ umode_t mode;
+ struct mq_attr attr;
+ } mq_open;
+ struct {
+ pid_t pid;
+ struct audit_cap_data cap;
+ } capset;
+ struct {
+ int fd;
+ int flags;
+ } mmap;
+ };
+ int fds[2];
+
+#if AUDIT_DEBUG
+ int put_count;
+ int ino_count;
+#endif
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+extern int audit_enabled;
extern int audit_ever_enabled;
+extern void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
+ const struct dentry *dentry,
+ const struct inode *inode);
+extern void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix,
+ kernel_cap_t *cap);
+extern void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name);
+extern void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context,
+ struct audit_names *n, struct path *path,
+ int record_num, int *call_panic);
+#endif
+
extern int audit_pid;
#define AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS 32
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index c682294..513d996 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -76,11 +76,6 @@
#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
#define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
-/* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
- * for saving names from getname(). If we get more names we will allocate
- * a name dynamically and also add those to the list anchored by names_list. */
-#define AUDIT_NAMES 5
-
/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
@@ -90,44 +85,6 @@ int audit_n_rules;
/* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
int audit_signals;
-struct audit_cap_data {
- kernel_cap_t permitted;
- kernel_cap_t inheritable;
- union {
- unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */
- kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */
- };
-};
-
-/* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
- * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
- * pointers at syscall exit time).
- *
- * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device.
- */
-struct audit_names {
- struct list_head list; /* audit_context->names_list */
- struct filename *name;
- unsigned long ino;
- dev_t dev;
- umode_t mode;
- kuid_t uid;
- kgid_t gid;
- dev_t rdev;
- u32 osid;
- struct audit_cap_data fcap;
- unsigned int fcap_ver;
- int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
- unsigned char type; /* record type */
- bool name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
- /*
- * This was an allocated audit_names and not from the array of
- * names allocated in the task audit context. Thus this name
- * should be freed on syscall exit
- */
- bool should_free;
-};
-
struct audit_aux_data {
struct audit_aux_data *next;
int type;
@@ -175,106 +132,6 @@ struct audit_tree_refs {
struct audit_chunk *c[31];
};
-/* The per-task audit context. */
-struct audit_context {
- int dummy; /* must be the first element */
- int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
- enum audit_state state, current_state;
- unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
- int major; /* syscall number */
- struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
- unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
- long return_code;/* syscall return code */
- u64 prio;
- int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
- /*
- * The names_list is the list of all audit_names collected during this
- * syscall. The first AUDIT_NAMES entries in the names_list will
- * actually be from the preallocated_names array for performance
- * reasons. Except during allocation they should never be referenced
- * through the preallocated_names array and should only be found/used
- * by running the names_list.
- */
- struct audit_names preallocated_names[AUDIT_NAMES];
- int name_count; /* total records in names_list */
- struct list_head names_list; /* anchor for struct audit_names->list */
- char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
- struct path pwd;
- struct audit_aux_data *aux;
- struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
- struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr;
- size_t sockaddr_len;
- /* Save things to print about task_struct */
- pid_t pid, ppid;
- kuid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
- kgid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
- unsigned long personality;
- int arch;
-
- pid_t target_pid;
- kuid_t target_auid;
- kuid_t target_uid;
- unsigned int target_sessionid;
- u32 target_sid;
- char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
-
- struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
- struct list_head killed_trees;
- int tree_count;
-
- int type;
- union {
- struct {
- int nargs;
- long args[6];
- } socketcall;
- struct {
- kuid_t uid;
- kgid_t gid;
- umode_t mode;
- u32 osid;
- int has_perm;
- uid_t perm_uid;
- gid_t perm_gid;
- umode_t perm_mode;
- unsigned long qbytes;
- } ipc;
- struct {
- mqd_t mqdes;
- struct mq_attr mqstat;
- } mq_getsetattr;
- struct {
- mqd_t mqdes;
- int sigev_signo;
- } mq_notify;
- struct {
- mqd_t mqdes;
- size_t msg_len;
- unsigned int msg_prio;
- struct timespec abs_timeout;
- } mq_sendrecv;
- struct {
- int oflag;
- umode_t mode;
- struct mq_attr attr;
- } mq_open;
- struct {
- pid_t pid;
- struct audit_cap_data cap;
- } capset;
- struct {
- int fd;
- int flags;
- } mmap;
- };
- int fds[2];
-
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG
- int put_count;
- int ino_count;
-#endif
-};
-
static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
{
int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
@@ -1093,88 +950,6 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
kfree(context);
}
-void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
-{
- char *ctx = NULL;
- unsigned len;
- int error;
- u32 sid;
-
- security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
- if (!sid)
- return;
-
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
- if (error) {
- if (error != -EINVAL)
- goto error_path;
- return;
- }
-
- audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
- return;
-
-error_path:
- audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
- return;
-}
-
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
-
-void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
- const struct cred *cred;
- char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
- struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
- char *tty;
-
- if (!ab)
- return;
-
- /* tsk == current */
- cred = current_cred();
-
- spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
- if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty)
- tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
- else
- tty = "(none)";
- spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
-
-
- audit_log_format(ab,
- " ppid=%ld pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
- " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
- " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u ses=%u tty=%s",
- sys_getppid(),
- tsk->pid,
- from_kuid(&init_user_ns, tsk->loginuid),
- from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
- from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->gid),
- from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->euid),
- from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->suid),
- from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid),
- from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->egid),
- from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid),
- from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid),
- tsk->sessionid, tty);
-
- get_task_comm(name, tsk);
- audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
-
- if (mm) {
- down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
- if (mm->exe_file)
- audit_log_d_path(ab, " exe=", &mm->exe_file->f_path);
- up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
- }
- audit_log_task_context(ab);
-}
-
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_info);
-
static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
u32 sid, char *comm)
@@ -1390,35 +1165,6 @@ static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
kfree(buf);
}
-static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
-{
- int i;
-
- audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
- CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
- audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
- }
-}
-
-static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
-{
- kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
- kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
- int log = 0;
-
- if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
- audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
- log = 1;
- }
- if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
- audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
- log = 1;
- }
-
- if (log)
- audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
-}
-
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -1516,68 +1262,6 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
audit_log_end(ab);
}
-static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
- int record_num, int *call_panic)
-{
- struct audit_buffer *ab;
- ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
- if (!ab)
- return; /* audit_panic has been called */
-
- audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
-
- if (n->name) {
- switch (n->name_len) {
- case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
- /* log the full path */
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
- break;
- case 0:
- /* name was specified as a relative path and the
- * directory component is the cwd */
- audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
- break;
- default:
- /* log the name's directory component */
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
- audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
- n->name_len);
- }
- } else
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
-
- if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
- " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho"
- " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
- n->ino,
- MAJOR(n->dev),
- MINOR(n->dev),
- n->mode,
- from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
- from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
- MAJOR(n->rdev),
- MINOR(n->rdev));
- }
- if (n->osid != 0) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(
- n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
- *call_panic = 2;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
- }
- }
-
- audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
-
- audit_log_end(ab);
-}
-
static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
int i, call_panic = 0;
@@ -1695,7 +1379,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
i = 0;
list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list)
- audit_log_name(context, n, i++, &call_panic);
+ audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
/* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
@@ -2060,41 +1744,6 @@ void audit_putname(struct filename *name)
#endif
}
-static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
-{
- struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
- int rc;
-
- if (!dentry)
- return 0;
-
- rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
- name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
- name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
- name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-
-/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
-static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
- const struct inode *inode)
-{
- name->ino = inode->i_ino;
- name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
- name->mode = inode->i_mode;
- name->uid = inode->i_uid;
- name->gid = inode->i_gid;
- name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
- audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
-}
-
/**
* __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
* @name: name being audited
--
1.7.9.5
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
--
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